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HOW SHOULD WE RESPOND TO THE GROWING RISKS
OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES?
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.1
Introduction
Passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act2 in November 1999 marked the beginning of a
new regime for regulating financial services in the United States. The GLB Act swept away the
prior legal constraints on affiliations among banks, securities firms and insurance companies.3 As
a result, all three types of financial institutions may now combine to form financial conglomerates

Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. B.A., Yale University; J.D.,
Harvard University. I gratefully acknowledge comments by participants in the conference on “Financial
Modernization After Gramm-Leach-Bliley,” held at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law on May 18, 2001,
where I presented a preliminary version of this article. Specia l thanks go to Patricia McCoy, who
organized the conference and provided very helpful suggestions. I am, of course, solely responsible for all
remaining errors. Unless otherwise indicated, this article includes developments through October 20, 2001.
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Act of Nov. 12, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 [hereinafter called the “GLB Act”].
For general discussions of the GLB Act, see Michael P. Malloy, Banking in the Twenty-First Century, 26
J. Corp. L. 787, 793-819 (2000); Michael K. O’Neal, Summary and Analysis of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, 28 Sec. Reg. L. J. 95 (2000).
2

The GLB Act authorized full-scale affiliations between banks and securities firms by repealing
Sections 20 and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, popularly known as the “Glass-Steagall Act.” See Act of
Nov. 12, 1999, supra note 2, § 101, 113 Stat. 1341. The GLB Act did not repeal two other provisions of
the Glass-Steagall Act – (i) Section 16, 12 U.S.C. § 24(S eventh), which prohibits banks fr om underwriting
or dealing in most types of securities, and (ii) Section 21, 12 U.S.C. § 378, which bars securities
underwriter s and dea lers from engaging in the business of accepting deposits. Thus, the GLB Act removed
the Glass-Steagall Act’s restrictions on affiliations between banks and securities fir ms, but banks and
securities firms each continue to be prohibited from engaging directly in the other industry’s core activities.
See P ATRIC IA A. MC COY , BANKING LAW MANUAL §§ 7.01, 7.02[1], 7.03[1], 7.03[3] & 7.04 (2000);
O’Neal, supra note 2, at 99-100.
3

For discussion of the GLB Act’s removal of legal restrictions on affiliations between banks and
insurance companies, see Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and After
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 26 J. Corp. L. 723, 748-61 (2000).
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under the umbrella structure of a “financial holding company.”4
Even before the GLB Act was passed, the legal barriers to financial consolidation were
“all but render[ed] . . . moot” by the FRB’s approval of a merger between Citicorp and Travelers.5
This merger created a huge diversified financial holding company called “Citigroup,” which
currently ranks as the world’s largest financial services organization.6 Proponents of financial
modernization hailed Citigroup as the first modern American “universal bank,” because it was the
first U.S. banking organization since 1933 that could offer comprehensive banking, securities, and

The GLB Act permits bank holding companies (viz., companies that control one or more banks)
to become financial holding companies by registering with the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”). The FRB
has general super visory responsibility as the “umbrella regulator” of financial holding companies. See
O’Neal, supra note 2, at 104-06. Nonbank subsidiaries of financial holding companies may engage in
activities that are designated as “financial in nature” in the GLB Act or in rulings made by the FRB after
consultation with the Treasury Department. See Act of Nov. 12, 1999, supra note 2, § 103(a), 113 Stat.
1342-50 (codified at 12 U. S.C. §§ 1843(k) - (o)). The GLB Act expr essly states that “financial in nature”
activities include (i) insurance underwriting, sales, broker age and portfolio investments, (ii) securities
underwriting, dealing, market making and brokerage, and (iii) merchant banking. See 12 U.S.C. §§
1843(k)(4)(B), (E) & (F); MC COY , supra note 3, § 4.03.
4

The GLB Act also allows national banks and state banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) to establish direct subsidiaries (known as “financial subsidiaries”) that conduct most
of the activities permitted to financial holding companies. However, financial subsidiaries of banks may
not engage in insurance underwriting, insurance company portfolio investments or merchant banking. See
Act of Nov. 12, 1999, supra note 2, § 121, 113 Stat. 1373-81 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24a & 1831w);
MC COY , supra note 3, § 4.06[1][a]; O’Neal, supra note 2, at 108-12.
5

O’Neal, supra note 2, at 96.

R. Christian Bruce, Fed Approves Citicorp-Travelers Merger Creating World’s Largest Bank
Company, 71 BNA’s Banking Rep. 449 (1998) [hereinafter cited as Bruce, Citicorp-Travelers Merger]
(reporting that Citigroup would initially have assets of $750 billion). By the second quarter of 2001,
Citigroup had grown in size to $940 billion and ranked first in the world in terms of both assets and market
capitalization. See Niamh Ring, Citi Surpasses Deutsche As No. 1 in Asset Size, Am. Banker, July 6,
2001, at 2; The Business Week Global 1000, Bus. Week, July 9, 2001, at 75 (tbl.) (showing that Citigroup
had a market capitalization of $261 billion as of May 31, 2001, compared to $116 billion for HSBC
Holdings, the second most highly-valued global bank).
6
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insurance services to its customers.7
The FRB approved the Citicorp-Travelers merger in September 1998, even though the
proposal “challenge[d] both t he statutory letter and regulatory spirit” of existing law and
Congress had not yet acted on pending financial modernization bills.8 Based on an exempt ion in
the federal Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”), the FRB’s order allowed Citigroup to offer
securities and insurance services beyond the scope of the BHC Act for up to five years after
Citicorp merged with Travelers.9 In practical effect, the FRB gave Citigroup a five-year charter
to o perat e as a universal bank and did not require Citigro up to divest any of its nonconforming

See, e. g., Yvette D. Kantrow & Liz Moyer, Citi, Travelers: A Global Leader Takes Shape, Am.
Banker, April 7, 1998, at 1; Michael Siconolfi, Big Umbrella: Travelers and Citicor p Agree to Join Forces
In $83 Billion Merger, Wall St. J., April 7, 1998, at A1. As used herein, the term “universal banking”
refers to a regime under which a single organization can engage (either directly or indirectly through
affiliates) in all aspects of the banking, securities and life insurance businesses. See ANTHONY SAUNDERS
& INGO WALTER, UNIVERSAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES: WHAT COULD WE GAIN ? WHAT COULD
WE LOSE ? 84-86, 128-29 (1994) (adopting the same definition of “universal banking”).
7

Edward J. Kane, Implications of superhero metaphors for the issue of banking powers, 23 J.
Banking & Fin. 663 (1999) [hereinafter cited as Kane, Banking Powers], at 666 (quote), 669.
8

Under Section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2), a nonbanking company is
exempt from the activity restrictions contained in Section 4 of the BHC Act for up to two years after it
acquires a bank. In addition, Section 4(a)(2) authorizes the FRB to grant up to three one-year extensions
of this exemption period. See Travelers Group, Inc., 84 Fed. Res. Bull. 985, 985-88 (1998) (relying on
exemption provided in Section 4(a)(2)). In approving the Citicorp-Travelers merger, the FRB deter mined
that about 25% of Tra velers’ assets and 40% of Travelers’ revenues were related to operations that did not
conform to the activity restrictions contained in Section 4 (in its pre-GLB Act version). Those
nonconforming activities included, inter alia, underwriting life insurance and property and casualty
insurance, investing in more than 5% of the voting shares of commercial companies, and controlling and
distributing shares of mutual funds. See id. at 985, 988.
9

A federal appeals court subsequently upheld the FRB’s order. The court concluded that the FRB’s
“literal compliance” with the exemption contained in Section 4(a)(2) rebutted any argument that the FRB
had violated the “purposes” of the BHC Act. Independent Community Bankers of America v. Bd. of
Governors, 195 F.3d 28, 31-32 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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securities or insurance activities.10
From a political perspective, Citigroup’s leaders “boldly gambled that they [could]
dragoon Congress . . . into legalizing their transformation” before the exemption period expired.11
Citigroup’s gamble proved to be well founded when Congress passed the GLB Act less than
fourteen months after the FRB appro ved the Citicorp-Travelers merger. The regulatory and
legislative responses to the merger raise troubling questions about (i) the degree of political
influence enjoyed by Citigroup and other major financial institutions, 12 and (ii) the FRB’s
willingness to pressure Congress by confronting it with the choice of either approving legislation

10

See, e.g., Bruce, Citicorp-Travelers Merger, supra note 6.

Kane, Banking Powers, supra note 9, at 666. See also Dean Anason, Advocates, Skeptics Face
Off on Megadeals, Am. Banker, April 30, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Anason, Megadeals], at 2
(reporting that Citigroup’s formation “was widely seen as a bid to push lawmakers to enact a sweeping
overhaul of financial laws,” a nd quoting Rep. Maurice Hinchey’s sta tement that Citigroup was “essentially
playing an expensive game of chicken with Congress”).
11

See Kane, Banking Powers, supra note 9, at 669. For example, before Citicorp and Travelers
filed their merger application, their leaders consulted with and essentially received advance clearance from
FRB chairman Alan Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and President Clinton. Subsequently,
Citigroup, together with other major financial institutions and industry trade groups, reportedly spent $300
million (including lobbying expenses and political contributions) to secure passage of the GLB Act.
Shortly before Congress passed the GLB Act, Citigroup a ppointed Mr. Rubin as its co-chairman.
Citigroup’s repr esentatives also played an active role in negotiations between congressional leaders and the
White House over the final terms of the GLB Act. Thus, Citigroup evidently enjoyed a very significant
degree of influence over regulators and political leaders during the period between its formation and
passage of the GLB Act. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Tra nsformation of the U.S. Financial Ser vices
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation and Increased Risks, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. Issue 2
(forthcoming) [hereinafter cited as Wilmarth, Transformation], Part I(D)(4)(b)(iv).
12

Indeed, Citigroup was widely viewed as the financia l institution that “benefitted the most” from the
GLB Act. Barbara A. Rehm, No Merger Wave, But Money Saved, Am. Banker, Nov. 7, 2000, at 1. See
also Barbara A. Rehm, How Citi Got Busy to Speed Fed’s Merger OK, Am. Banker, July 30, 2001, at 1
(stating that the creation of Citigroup “required significant political muscle” and “spurr[ed] Congress to
finally enact sweeping financial reform legislation”).

4

to ratify the merger or forcing a potentially disruptive breakup of a huge financial conglomerate.13
Although the Citigroup merger and the GLB Act were landmark events, in a broader sense
they are byproducts of the fundamental restructuring that has taken place in the U.S. financial
services industry over the past quarter century. The dividing lines between banks, securities firms
and insurance companies were eroding long before the FRB approved Citigroup’s formation and
Congress passed the GLB Act. This growing “homogenization” among the three financial
sectors was spurred by rapid improvements in information technology, deregulation and financial
innovations that broke down traditional barriers between the three sectors.
For example, sophisticated computer systems and new financial instruments (e.g.,
commercial paper, junk bonds and asset-backed securities) made it feasible to “securitize” many
types of business and consumer debt. As a result, many cust omers that previously relied on bank
loans gained access to financing from nonbank sources such as finance companies and the public
and institutional credit markets. Additionally, advances in information technology and the
creation of new financial products enabled aggressive “niche” providers (e.g., credit card banks,
discount brokers and mutual fund companies) to offer low-cost cash management and investment
management services to the general public. In response to these developments, consumers shifted
a rapidly growing share of their investment funds from traditional bank deposits and life insurance
policies into mutual funds, variable annuities and other investment vehicles linked to the financial
markets.
In combination, these developments caused a dramatic increase in competition and a
See Bruce, Citicorp-Travelers Merger, supra note 6 (citing arguments made by critics of the
merger); Fed to Consider Citicorp, Travelers Merger, (New Orleans, LA) Times-Picayune, Sept. 22, 1998,
at C5 (same).
13
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narrowing of profit margins in the markets served by banks, securities firms and life insurance
companies. In each of the three financial sectors, incumbent firms encountered declining profits
from traditional activities, increased competition from outside entrants, higher risks from new
lines of business, and growing pressures to consolidate. Each sector is currently far more
vulnerable to financial stress than it was during the early 1970's.14
Large banks, securities broker-dealers and life insurers responded to these trends by
pursuing a twofold consolidation strategy designed to defend their existing markets and capture
new sources of revenue. First, market leaders within each industry sector sought to enhance their
market power by acquiring their traditional competitors. Second, market leaders tried to diversify
their activities by acquiring firms in other sectors.
This program of consolidation has triggered a wave of mergers within and across the
banking, securities and insurance sectors. In the banking industry, a far-reaching consolidation
was made possible by (i) new state and federal laws that removed longstanding barriers to
geographic expansion, and (ii) lenient antitrust policies adopted by federal bank regulators and the
Justice Department. Since 1980, t he number of banking organizations has fallen by nearly half
and the market share held by the ten largest banks has more than doubled.15 Three huge bank

For a detailed analysis of the industry trends descr ibed in the foregoing three paragraphs, see
Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(A) & (C), II(A) & (B).
14

See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(D)(1) (describing rapid consolidation
within the U.S. banking industr y, and reporting that (i) the number of independent U.S. banking
organizations declined from 12,500 to 6,800 during 1979-99, and (ii) the percentage of banking industry
assets held by the 10 largest banks grew from 23% to 49% during 1984-99). The term “ba nking
organization,” as used in this chapter, includes each independent bank and each bank holding company that
controls one or more banks. Unless the context indicates otherwise, the term “bank” is used to refer to both
a chartered bank and a bank holding company.
15
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mergers were announced in 1998,16 and four additional mergers of comparable magnitude were
agreed to during 1999-2001.17 As a result of this consolidation, the U.S. banking industry is
rapidly developing a two-tiered structure. Within the next decade, it appears likely that a small
group of very large banks will control most of the industry’s assets while the remaining
competitors will primarily be community-based institutions or specialized niche providers. Similar
patterns of consolidation have occurred within the securities and insurance sectors.18
Cross-industry acquisitions have also become important in recent years, as a result of
favorable rulings issued by federal banking agencies and the courts. Even before the GLB Act
was passed, all of the twenty-five largest U.S. bank holding companies had established
subsidiaries engaged in securities underwriting and dealing, and banks had made significant
inroads into the insurance business. At the same time, several large securities firms and insurance
companies operated conglomerates that competed with each other and with banks over a wide
range of financial businesses.19 The GLB Act has given further impetus to cross-industry
consolidation. During 2000 alone, two large foreign banks acquired major U.S. securities firms,
another leading foreign bank purchased a large U.S. insurance company, and Charles Schwab and

See id. (discussing mergers in 1998 between NationsBank and BankAmerica , Bank One and
First Chicago NBD, and Norwest and Wells Fargo).
16

See id. (discussing a merger between Fleet and BankBoston in 1999, and mergers that combined
J.P. Morgan with Chase and FirstStar with U.S. Bancorp in 2000); R. Christian Bruce, Fed Clears First
Union, Wachovia Deal; Combined Institution Ranks Fourth in U.S., 77 BNA’s Banking Rep. 315 (2001).
17

18

See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(D)(2), II(C) & (D).

19

See id., Parts I(E)(2)(a)(i) & II(C).
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MetLife acquired banks.20
Advocates of universal banking contend that the creation of giant financial conglomerates
will produce three major benefits: (i) increased efficiency and profitability for financial firms, due
to larger economies of scale and scope, (ii) increased safety and soundness for financial firms
through a greater diversification of their business lines, and (iii) lower-cost services and improved
convenience for consumers based on the concept of “one-stop shopping.”21 However, I strongly
doubt whether these optimistic forecasts will be realized. As discussed in Part I of this paper, no
domestic or foreign firm has yet realized, on a long-term basis, the theoretical advantages of
establishing a “financial supermarket.”
In fact, Part I sho ws that big diversified financial providers have produced a largely
disappointing record over the past two decades. Many domestic and foreign financial
conglomerates have encountered serious difficulties since the early 1980's, and several of them
have abandoned their efforts to establish universal banks. Similarly, mergers among big banks, or
between banks and other financial institutions, generally have failed to produce substantial
improvements in efficiency, profitability, shareholder value or customer service. Thus, the
experience of the last two decades provides little support for the assumption that financial

See John Tagliabue, Acquisition Highlights Swiss Flair for Managing Expansion, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 31, 2000, at C20 (discussing Credit Suisse’s acquisition of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette and UBS’
acquisition of PaineWebber); Amy L. Anderson, Sales at Banks A Key Prize In ING Deal For ReliaStar,
Am. Banker, May 2, 2000, at 1; Pui-Wing Tam & Randall Smith, Schwab, Going for High-End Clients,
Sets $2.9 Billion Stock Accord for U.S. Trust, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 2000, at C1; Lee Ann Gjertsen,
MetLife Has Big Plans for One-Branch Bank, Am. Banker, Aug. 17, 2000, at 1.
20

See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 44, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1999); James R. Barth, R. Dan
Brumbaugh Jr. & James A. Wilcox, The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of Broad Banking, 14 J.
Econ. Perspectives 191, 198-99 (2000).; Joao A.C. Santos, Commercial Banks in the Securities Business:
A Review, 14 J. Fin. Serv. Res. 35, 37-41 (1998).
21
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conglomerates will achieve the rosy projections offered by advocates of universal banking.
Doubts about the claimed advantages of universal banks are buttressed by concerns that
financial conglomerates will intensify the problem of systemic risk in the financial markets. Over
the past two decades, leading banks, securities firms and life insurers have pursued aggressive
syndicated lending and securitization programs, as well as speculative underwriting and
investment activities in the markets for securities and financial derivatives. These high-risk
activities have made large financial institutions vulnerable to serious losses during disruptions in
the capital markets. In addition, the growing concentration of securities and derivatives activities
within a small group of major financial institutions increases the likelihood t hat the failure of any
big institution could create spillover effects and trigger a costly bailout by federal regulators.
A further threat posed by financial conglomeration is that regulators will feel compelled to
prevent the failure of troubled securities firms and life insurers which are affiliated with major
banks. Consequently, the federal “safety net” for banks22 could be wrapped around entire
financial holding companies, thereby undermining the ability of regulators and investors to control
the risks of those entities. As discussed in Part II(A) of this paper, domestic and foreign
regulat ors are currently revising their policies in an effort to improve capital requirements and
enhance supervisory and market discipline over large financial conglomerates. However, Part II
concludes that these new regulatory initiatives are unlikely to solve the underlying problems of
supervisory forbearance and moral hazard, which are the inevitable corollaries of the “too big to
fail” (“TBTF”) policy.

See infra note 43 (discussing the federal “safety net” and suggesting that it confers a substantial
net subsidy on banks).
22
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Part III proposes a new plan for bank regulation and deposit insurance that is designed to
counteract the TBTF doctrine’s perverse effects. Under this plan, financial conglomerates would
be allowed to accept FDIC-insured deposits only within narrow banks, and those banks would be
barred from making transfers of funds or credit to affiliates (except for lawful dividends out of
profits). The FDIC would be strictly prohibited from paying any uninsured claims when banks
fail, and the deposit insurance funds would be completely insulated from the cost of TBTF
bailouts. Drawing on its emergency powers as “lender of last resort” (“LOLR”), the FRB would
bear primary responsibility for dealing with financial failures involving systemic risk. The FRB
would be required to recover the cost of TBTF rescues from financial conglomerates, because
those entities are the main beneficiaries of the TBTF doctrine. Three additional recommendations
would enhance both regulatory and market-based controls over the risk-taking incentives of
universal banks.
I.

Financial Conglomerates Are Not Likely to Produce Their Expected Benefits, and
They Will Aggravate Systemic Risk Within the U.S. Economy
A.

The Creation of Big Financial Holding Companies Is Unlikely to Improve
Either the Efficiency or the Profitability of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry

Based on the experience of the past two decades, there is little evidence to support the
view that large financial conglomerates will perform better than smaller or more specialized
financial institutions. Most empirical studies have not found global economies of scale or scope in
large diversified banks, full-service securities firms or multiple-line insurance companies. In each
sector, the biggest and most diversified firms have consistently produced lower profits and inferior
efficiency ratings when compared to smaller or more specialized competitors. Thus, for example,

10

(i) smaller regional and community banks and focused credit card banks are more efficient and
profitable than the largest money center banks, (ii) specialized discount brokers have produced
higher returns on equity than full-service broker-dealers, and (iii) specialized life insurers are more
efficient than multiple-line insurance companies.23
Moreover, most large mergers among financial firms have failed to produce the
“synergies” expected by advocates of consolidation. The great majority of big U.S. bank mergers
during the 1990's generated disappointing profits and long-term losses in shareholder wealth.
Several of the largest bank mergers during 1996-98 are now widely viewed as costly
disappointments or outright failures (viz., Bank One’s mergers with First Chicago NBD and First
USA, First Union’s acquisitions of CoreStates and Money Store, NationsBank’s mergers with
Barnett Banks and Bank o f America, and Wells Fargo’s hostile acquisition of First Interstate). All
of these mergers produced major customer defect ions, rapid increases in nonperforming loans and
large profit shortfalls. The difficulties caused by these mergers, during a period of unprecedented
economic expansion, raise troubling questions about the potential problems that could emerge at
large consolidated banks if the U.S. economy experiences a severe recession. 24
Cross-industry diversification has shown no more success than big bank mergers. The
“financial supermarkets” created during the 1980's by American Express, GE, Kemper, Prudential
and Sears have all been dismantled. Since 1990, AXA, Bankers Trust, Barclays, ING, NatWest

23

III(A).

See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(D)(4)(b)(i), II(B)(2), II(C), II(D) &

See id., Part I(D)(4)(a); Ken Brown & Nikhil Deogun, Heard on the Street: The Incredible
Shrinking Bank Premium: Wachovia Deal Illustrates Mood of Caution, Wall St. J., April 17, 2001, at C1
(discussing serious pr oblems encountered by Bank of America, Bank One and First Union after making
aggressive acquisitions in the late 1990's); Deal-making done, Economist, Jan. 27, 2001 (same).
24
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and Security Pacific have either been driven into forced mergers or decided to abandon the capital
markets business sector after ambitious expansion plans produced disappointing results. Bank of
America’s acquisition of Montgomery Securities proved t o be an expensive failure, while
Conseco’s purchase of Green Tree produced huge losses. The most spectacular disaster occurred
at Credit Lyonnais, which suffered huge losses after its merchant banking unit, Altus Finance,
made risky invest ments in a variety of European and overseas enterprises. The Credit Lyonnais
fiasco ultimately forced the French government to finance a $20 billion rescue plan for the bank.
Five big international banks – J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank and UBS – have continued to pursue a universal banking strategy. However, all five banks
have incurred significant losses from capital markets activities at various times in recent years, and
even Citigroup cannot yet be declared a long-term success. During the first nine months of 2001,
a general slump in the world’s equity markets caused sharp declines in earnings from investment
banking operations at all five banks. In September, the destruction of the World Trade Center by
terrorists inflicted substantial losses on Citigroup’s insurance operations and further depressed the
earnings of major investment banks. Thus, the diversification strategies implemented by all five
banks have exposed them to material risks during disruptions in the financial markets.25
For a more detailed discussion of the developments noted in the preceding two para graphs, see
Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(E)(2)(a)(ii), I(E)(2)(c) & II(C). For r eports of declining
profits from investment banking activities at the five leading international banks during the first nine
months of 2001, see, e.g., Jathon Sapsford et al., Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase and FleetBoston See
Earnings Slump, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at A4; Liz Moyer, JP M-Chase, Fleet Feel Pain of Slow
Markets, Am. Banker, July 19, 2001, at 1; Liz Moyer et al., Profits Off, Citi, B of A Brace for More Pain,
Am. Banker, April 17, 2001, at 1; Alissa Schmelkin, Credit Suisse Group Profits Tumble 23%, No Upturn
Forecast, Am. Banker, Aug. 30, 2001, at 3; Marcus Walker, Slowdown Grips Deutsche Bank, Profit Falls
49%, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 2001, at A10; World Business Briefing Europe: Switzerland: Bank Profit Falls,
N. Y. Times, Aug. 15, 2001, at W1 (r eporting a 33% decline in second-quarter profits at UBS). For
descriptions of problems caused by the terrorist attack in September, see Paul Beckett et al., Citigroup
Joins Firms Warning Of Slim Profits, Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 2001, at A3 (reporting that Citigroup would
25
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A major reason for the disappointing results of universal banking efforts is that most
customers (with the possible exception of very large corporations) have not embraced the concept
of “one-stop shopping.” Consumers, small businesses and mid-sized firms have expressed a
strong preference for diversifying their purchases of financial services among several providers.
Customer at titudes help to explain why the “financial supermarkets” of the 1980's failed and why
the great financial success stories of the 1990's were focused providers – viz., credit card banks,
innovative community-oriented banks, discount brokers and mutual fund managers. Specialized
financial firms have earned customer loyalty by providing superior service and/or better
investment returns at lower cost. The Internet has greatly enhanced the appeal of specialty firms,
because it permits consumers and smaller businesses to make inexpensive nationwide searches for
the most attractive combination of price and service. In contrast to t hese focused competitors,
big diversified banks and full-service securities firms have consistently charged higher fees and
paid lower returns on deposits or investments. Indeed, o ne reason to be skept ical about the
claimed advantages of “one-stop shopping” in a consolidated financial services industry is that
major banks have not delivered on their promises to provide better service and lower prices in a

lose $700 million due to insurance claims and the disruption of financial markets); Niamh Ring, Merrill’s
Cuts Set Off New Talk of Sale, Am. Banker, Oct. 19, 2001, at 2; Emily Thornton, Wall Street: The Big
Chill, Bus. Week, Oct. 22, 2001, at 120 [hereinafter cited as Thornton, Wall Street].
Another reason for doubting the long-term success of universal banking is that, since the late
1980's, major European banks have produced very disappointing results after acquiring investment banking
firms in England and the United States. See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(E)(2)(a)(ii);
David Fairlamb, All that Glitters . . . European banks muff their U.S. buys, Bus. Week, Aug. 13, 2001, at
44; Marcus Walker, Securities Work Taxes European Banks: Earnings Reveal Toll Of Withering Markets
On Investment Units, Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 2001, at A10.
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consolidated banking industry. 26
Three additional factors help to explain why most big banks and other large diversified
financial firms in the United Stat es have failed to generate the efficiency and profitability gains
predicted by consolidation advocates. First, complex organizational structures and agency
conflicts often prevent financial conglomerates from realizing on potential synergies. Second,
managers frequently pursue expansion and diversification programs for reasons that have nothing
to do with improving customer loyalty or shareholder returns. Managerial hubris and self-interest
– particularly the desire to avoid market and regulatory discipline by achieving TBTF status – are
powerful motivations behind many big financial mergers. Third, executives must at least pay lip
service to “shareholder value” in an age of powerful institutional shareholders. Accordingly,
acquiring firms typically issue highly optimistic forecasts about potential cost savings and profit
gains when mergers are announced. To achieve these forecasts, acquiring firm managers are
tempted to seek higher returns by making drastic cuts in personnel and facilities, pursuing more
risky activities and increasing leverage. These aggressive strategies typically alienate customers
and produce unexpected losses, often on a very large scale.27
See Wilmarth, Transformation, Parts I(D)(2), I(D)(4)(b)(iii) & II(D). See also Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., Too Good to Be True?, The Unfulfilled Promises Behind Big Bank Mergers, 2 Stan. J. L.,
Bus. & Fin. 1 (1995) [hereinafter cited as Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers], at 4-5, 31-41, 87 (contending
that, despite optimistic claims made by advocates of consolida tion, big bank mergers actually produced
inferior service and higher prices for consumers and small businesses); Gerald A. Hanweck & Bernard
Shull, The bank merger movement: efficiency, stability and competitive policy concerns, 44 Antitr ust Bull.
251, 258-59, 265-81 (1999) (presenting similar argument); Timothy H. Hannan, Retail Fees of Depository
Institutions, 1994-99, 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 1, 8-11 (2001) (reporting that, compared with single-state banks
and smaller banks, multistate banks and larger banks charged significantly higher fees on deposit accounts
in 1999).
26

See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(C), I(D)(4)(b), I(E)(1), I(E)(2) & II(C).
See also Matt Murra y, Critical Mass: As Huge Companies Keep Growing, CEOs Struggle to Keep Pace,
Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 2001, at A1 (reporting that (i) “[m]any of the new behemoths created by [recent]
27
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In addition to the disappointing record of large financial conglomerates in the United
Stat es, it is noteworthy that European universal banks have been less efficient, less profitable and
less creative than the top U.S. banks and securities firms over the past three decades. During that
period, major U.S. commercial banks have produced higher earnings and maintained better
efficiency ratios than the leading French, German and Swiss banks. Similarly, the “big three” U.S.
securities firms have dominated European universal banks in the international markets for
underwriting securities and advising on corporate mergers and acquisitions.
Most analysts attribute the superior performance of U.S. banks and securities firms to the
following factors: (i) U.S. financial firms have faced much more rigorous competition in their
home markets, compared to the big European universal banks, and (ii) as a result of this
competitive stimulus, U.S. financial firms have produced most of the major financial innovations
during the past thirty years, including a broad array of mutual funds, asset-backed securities, overthe-counter (“OTC”) derivatives and other creative financial instruments. These American
innovations have transformed global finance by encouraging a strong trend toward (A) replacing
intermediated bank credit with capital markets financing, and (B) expanding the use of risk
management tools based on sophisticated computer models.28
mergers are floundering,” including “[a]cquisitive banks like Bank of America Corp. and Bank One Corp.,”
and (ii) many corporate CEOs admit that “bigness has become a ba ttle with a new kind of complexity and a
new degree of turmoil”); Barbara A. Rehm, Departures: The Goodbye Boys, Am. Banker, Feb. 1, 2001
(“Best in Banking” supplement), at 16A (reporting that, when asked whether a bank can be “too big,”
former First Union chairman Edward Crutchfield replied: “I don’t know. . . . There is no question that size
brings benefits. But do they outweigh the downside of being slow, bureaucratic? I’m not sure”).
For a more detailed analysis of the comparative performance of U.S. and European financial
firms, see Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(E)(2)(a)(ii) & III(A). See also George G.
Kaufman, Designing the New Architecture for U.S. Banking, in B ENTON E. GUP , ED ., THE NEW
FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE : BANKING REGULATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2001) [hereinafter cited as
NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE ], at 39 [hereinafter cited as Kaufman, Banking Architecture], at 43-44
28
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The comparatively poor performance of European universal banks over the past three
decades – like the failures of U.S. “financial supermarkets” during the 1980's – creates substantial
doubts whether major financial holding companies will achieve the efficiency and profitability
gains predicted by supporters of the GLB Act. Past experience suggests that large, diversified
financial organizations (i) will find it very difficult to produce the synergies expected from crossselling, and (ii) will be hampered by managerial diseconomies, agency conflicts and unprofitable
cross-subsidies between divisional units. In addition, concerns about the longer-term effects of
universal banking have been created by the rapid pace of global consolidation among banks and
securities firms and the growing concentration of market power in wholesale financial markets.
Continued mergers among major international financial institutions could eliminate most midsized
investment banks, thereby reducing competition and innovation in the provision of capital markets
services to large corporations.29

(stating that U.S. banks have been more profitable than French, German and Swiss banks since 1960);
Christos Staikouras, Geoffrey Wood & Rosie Denney, Bank Non-Interest Income: A Source of Stability?,
Feb. 2000 (available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=233905>), at 8-13 (including tbls. 3
& 5) (showing that U.S. banks had a significantly higher average return on assets than European banks
during the 1990's).
See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part III(A). Over the past five years, mergers
among domestic and foreign banks and securities firms have created eight global investment banks – viz.,
the “Big Three” of Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch, along with Citigroup, J.P. Morgan
Chase, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and UBS. The size and financial resour ces of those eight firms have
caused many analysts to question whether midsized securities firms (e.g., Lehman Brothers and Bear
Stearns) can survive as effective competitors. In this regard, a prominent former federal bank regulator has
predicted that global consolidation will ultimately produce a dozen financial companies controlling “85%
of the world’s private-sector financial services assets within 20 years.” See Dean Anason, Welcome for
Reform Law Gives Way to Uncertainty, Am. Banker, Dec. 16, 1999, at 2 (citing prediction by Eugene
Ludwig, Deutsche Bank vice chairman and former Comptroller of the Currency); Randall Smith & Charles
Gasparino, Heard on the Street: Lehman Tries to Thrive as a Solo Player As Mergers Turn Its Rivals Into
Goliaths, Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 2000, at C1; Premier investment banks form global giants, 35 Mergers &
Acquisitions No. 9, Oct. 2000, at 13 (stating that “[t]he implications of investment banking consolidation
for corporate clients ha ve yet to be explored,” given “the reduced number of choices they face for [merger
29

16

B.

Financial Conglomerates Pose a Significant Potential Threat to the Safety
and Stability of the U.S. Financial Services Industry

Advocates of universal banking claim that a safer financial system will be created as banks
diversify into securities and life insurance activities.30 However, there are at least three reasons to
question the accuracy of this claim. First, consolidation of the U.S. banking industry during the
past two decades has not produced a safer banking system. Second, financial conglomeration is
likely to extend the federal “safety net” to include nonbank affiliates of major banks. Third, the
GLB Act will promote a greater consolidation of risk within the financial sector, because it has
removed the structural separations that (i) previously shielded commercial and investment banks
from problems occurring in the other sector, and (ii) enabled each sector to serve as an
independent source of financing during financial disruptions.
1.

Consolidation and Increased Risk in the Banking Sector

Despite predictions that consolidation of the U.S. banking industry would create safer
banks that were larger and more geographically diversified, bigger banks have not proven to be
safer institutions. Large banks failed at a higher rate than small banks during 1971-91, and
excessive risk-taking by large banks posed the greatest threat to t he stability of the U.S. banking
system during the banking crisis of 1980-92. Several large interstate banks failed or came close to
and acquisition] and corporate finance services”).
Rapid consolidation within the syndicated lending market provides another example of the potential
adverse effects of mergers and acquisitions on competition in wholesale financial markets. During the past
ten years, the top five agent banks increased their collective share of U.S. loan syndications from 26% to
61%. In a recent survey of corporate finance officers, 72% of the respondents expressed concern that this
consolidation could lead to “monopolistic” pricing for syndicated loans. Jathon Sapsford & Paul Beckett,
Bank Roles: How Consolidation Alters the Field, Wall St. J., April 23, 2001, at C1, C9.
30

198.

See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 44, supra note 21, at 4-6; Barth, Brumbaugh & Wilcox, supra note 21, at
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failure during that crisis, because their poorly-managed gro wth and high-risk lending
overwhelmed any advantages provided by geographic diversification. Federal bank regulators
granted ext ensive supervisory forbearance to large troubled banks, and the FRB adopted a highly
accommodating interest rate policy in order to rehabilitate those banks in the early 1990's.31
Notwithstanding the painful lessons of the 1980's, big banks resumed their pattern of highrisk behavior almost as soon as they returned to financial health beginning in 1993. During the
past several years, major banks have pursued rapid growth in risky lines of business tied directly
or indirectly to the capital markets – e.g., leveraged syndicated lending, underwriting junk bonds,
investing in venture capital projects, dealing and trading in OTC derivatives, and securitizing
subprime consumer loans. All of these activities have proven to be vulnerable to sudden
disruptions or downturns in the capital markets. At the same time, large banks have artificially
boosted their per-share earnings by reducing their capital ratios and loan loss reserves, thereby
increasing their vulnerability to adverse economic changes. The current risks facing big banks are
reflected in the large losses that several major banks have reported from trading, investing or
securitization activities since 1997.32 In addition, compared to smaller banks, big banks as a
See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(E)(1) (discussing the banking crisis of
1980-92, supervisory forbearance granted to Bank of America and Citicorp after their near-failures, and
the FRB’s decision to relax its interest r ate policy during the early 1990's). See also Wilmarth, Big Bank
Mergers, supra note 26, at 4-6, 41-61, 87 (contending that consolidation failed to produce a safer banking
system during 1980-95); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks
of Nationwide Banks, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 957 (1992) [hereinafter cited as Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail], at 98494 (discussing the failure of Bank of New England and the near-failures of Citicorp, C&S/Sovran and First
Interstate during the early 1990's); JOHN SPIEGE L ET AL ., BANKING REDEFINED 164-65, 199-200, 210, 421
(Irwin Professional Publishing, 1996) (describing the near-fa ilures of Midlantic and C&S/Sovran, and
stating that First Interstate “was almost wiped out by loan losses from acquisitions in Texas and Arizona,”
id. at 421).
31

See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(C) & I(E)(2) (discussing (i) higher risks
assumed by big banks after 1992, and (ii) large losses from trading, investing or securitization activities
32
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group have experienced a much more rapid increase in charged-o ff and nonperforming loans
during the same period.33
Consolidation of the U.S. banking industry thus appears to have promoted an
intensification of risk. Over the past three decades, large U.S. banks have shown a consistent
pattern of shifting to more aggressive strategies as t hey grow in size. Throughout this period, big
U.S. banks have operated with significantly higher leverage, less liquidity and a more risky assetliability mix. A recent study of banking systems in twenty-one developed nations found that the
U.S. experience is not an isolated phenomenon. This study concluded that the largest banks in
these countries engaged in more risky activities and, as a result, faced higher risks of insolvency
during 1988-98.34
The TBTF doctrine – i.e., the policy of protecting both insured and uninsured depositors
in large failing banks – provides the most likely explanation for this correlation between increased

incurred by Bank of America, Bankers Trust and Citigroup during 1998, and by Bank of America, Bank
One, J.P. Morgan Chase, FleetBoston, First Union and Wells Fargo during 2000-01).
See R. Alton Gilbert, Problem Business Loans Rise at Large Banks, Monetary Trends, Fed.
Res. Bank of St. Louis, MO, Nov. 2000 (available at <www.stls.frb.org>) (showing that, during 19972000, nonperforming business loans and charge-offs rose at a much more rapid rate among banks that were
larger than $10 billion). During the first quarter of 2001, three big banks (Bank of America, Bank One and
J.P. Morgan Chase) charged off nearly $2 billion in bad loans and still held almost $11 billion of
nonperforming loans at the end of the quar ter. See Barbara A. Rehm, It’s Bank One, Wells, Fleet in Loa nLoss Reserves Derby, Am. Banker, April 27, 2001, at 1.
33

See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(C), I(D)(4)(b)(iv) & I(E) (discussing
higher-risk strategies pursued by large U.S. banks since the 1970's) ; HENRY KAUFMAN , ON MONEY AND
MARKETS: A WALL STREET MEMOIR (2000) [hereinafter KAUFMAN , ON MONEY AND MARKETS], at 22331, 242-46, 259-68, 278-86, 306-07 (same); Gianni De Nicolo, Size, Charter Value and Risk in Banking:
An International Perspective, April 2001, at 3-4, 11-21, 24-25 (available at
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id+255465>) (studying the effects of bank size on the
operating risk and insolvency risk of publicly-traded banks in 21 developed nations – including the U.S.,
Japan and major European countries – during 1988-98).
34
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bank size and greater risk. Between 1972 and mid-1992, U.S. bank regulators protected
uninsured depositors and payments system creditors at every failed bank with assets of more than
$1 billion. Federal regulators applied the TBTF policy most prominently in protecting uninsured
claimants at Continental Illinois in 1984, First City and First RepublicBank in 1988, MCorp in
1989, and Bank of New England in 1991. Congress effectively codified the TBTF policy in 1991.
As a consequence, the rapid consolidation of the U.S. banking industry over the past decade has
substantially increased the risk that a major bank failure could bankrupt the FDIC’s deposit
insurance fund.35
Federal regulators officially announced the TBTF doctrine when they rescued Continental
Illinois in 1984. In fact, however, regulators had implicitly followed a TBTF policy when they protected
uninsured depositors and other creditors at Franklin National Bank in 1974 and First Pennsylvania in 1980.
In 1991, Congress provided a statutory basis for TBTF rescues by enacting Section 141 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (“FDICIA”). Section 141 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1823(c)(4)(G)) authorizes federal regulators to protect uninsured depositors and other creditors in a large
failing bank when such action is needed to prevent “serious effects on economic conditions or financial
stability.” This authority to protect uninsured claimants in a situation involving “systemic risk” is a
significant exception to FDICIA’s general rule, which bars the FDIC from making payments to uninsured
parties that would incr ease the cost of resolving a failed bank. For a discussion of the TBTF doctrine and
Section 141 of FDICIA, see Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(E)(1).
35

The collapse of First City in 1992 was the first failure of a bank lar ger than $1 billion in which the
FDIC did not give full and immediate protection to all uninsured depositors. See F ED . DEPOSIT INS .
CORP ., MANAGING THE CRIS IS : THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE , 1980-94, at 577-80, 723-25 (Aug.
1998). No U.S. bank larger than $3 billion has failed since 1992, and federal regulators therefore do not
have a recent track record in applying the TBTF policy. However, many analysts believe that regulators
would protect uninsured depositors and payments system creditors if any of the 15 or 20 largest banks were
threatened with failure. See, e.g., Ron J. Feldman & Arthur J. Rolnick, Fixing FDICIA: A Plan to Address
the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 12 Region No. 1, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, MN, Mar. 1998, at 2, 69; Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 31, at 997-1004; Rob Blackwell, As ‘Super Banks’ Grow, So Do
Analysts’ Fears, Am. Banker, Aug. 7, 2000, at 1.
For evidence that consolidation in the U.S. banking industry has significantly incr eased the
vulnerability of the FDIC’s deposit insurance fund, see, e.g., Robert Oshinsky, Effects of Bank
Consolidation on the Bank Insurance Fund, FDIC Working Paper No. 99-3 (available at <www.fdic.gov>),
at 2, 12-18 (finding that (i) “the solvency of the [Bank Insurance Fund (“BIF”)] of today is inseparably tied
to the health of the largest banking organizations” (id. at 2); and (ii) the failure of any of the 10 largest U.S.
banks would create a 12.5% chance of BIF insolvency); William M. Isaac, Financial Reform’s Unfinished
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Studies have shown that the TBTF policy provides a significant implicit subsidy to the
largest banks, because (i) it allows big banks to pay below-average interest rates to depositors and
other creditors, and (ii) it leads shareholders and uninsured creditors to tolerate lower capital
ratios and higher risk profiles at major banks. The risk-taking behavior of big U.S. banks over the
past three decades indicates that they fully recognize and exploit their TBTF subsidy. Once again,
the relative ineffectiveness of market discipline over big U.S. banks is not a unique experience.
For example, a recent study found a strong link between TBTF status and perverse risk incentives
among large European banks.36
Agenda, 14 Region No. 1, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, MN, Mar. 2000, at 34, 37 (stating concerns of
a former FDIC chair man about the agency’s ability to handle the failure of a giant banking organization
like Citigroup, since “Citigroup, at nearly $800 billion in size, towers over the $29 billion FDIC fund”).
For the impact of the TBTF doctrine in encouraging greater risk-taking by major U.S. banks,
see Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(D)(4)(b)(iv), I(E)(1) & (2) (discussing impact of the
TBTF doctrine upon major U.S. banks); Feldman & Rolnick, supra note 35, at 6-9 (same); KAUFMAN , ON
MONEY AND MARKETS, supra note 34, at 207-10, 226-30, 259-68, 278-86 (same) Edward J. Ka ne,
Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?,
32 J. Money, Credit & Banking 672 (2000) [hereinafter cited as Kane, Megamerger Incentives, at 673-74,
691-94.
36

For recent studies documenting the implicit subsidy provided to big U.S. banks by the TBTF
policy, see, e.g., Craig H. Furfine, Banks as Monitors of Other Banks: Evidence from the Overnight
Federal Funds Market, 74 J. Bus. 33, 36-40, 47 (2001) (finding that, during 1998, banks with more than
$10 billion of assets paid significantly lower interest rates on over night loans than those paid by smaller
banks); Hanweck & Shull, supr a note 26, at 274-76 (showing that, in 1997, big banks paid much lower
interest rates on deposits and operated with substantially lower equity capital ratios, compar ed to smaller
banks); Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Stiroh, Bond Market Discipline of Banks, in THE CHANGING
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND REGULATION, at 494, 504-06 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., IL, 36th
Ann. Conf. on Bank Structure & Competition, 2000) (concluding that, during 1993-98, (i) public bond
markets applied much less stringent discipline to banks with assets of more than $85 billion, and (ii)
weaker bond market discipline was especially evident among the 11 big banks tha t were publicly identified
as TBTF in 1984).
A recent study found that the intr oduction of mandatory deposit insurance in the Eur opean Union
(“EU”) in 1995 reduced risk-taking among most EU banks. This risk-reduction effect occurred because, in
several EU countries, de jure deposit insurance programs with limited coverage replaced earlier de facto
policies of protecting all bank creditors during financial crises. The study concluded that the new EU
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2.

Expansion of the Federal Safety Net

Mergers among banks, securities firms and insurance companies are likely to extend the
scope of the TBTF subsidy to reach nonbank affiliates of large financial holding companies.
Although the GLB Act mandates “firewalls” to separate bank subsidiaries from their nonbank
affiliates, those legal barriers are difficult to enforce and are likely to become highly permeable in
times of financial stress. During an economic crisis – when investors and creditors are most
uncert ain about the soundness of financial intermediaries – banks and other financial institutions
have a powerful reputational interest in supporting their troubled nonbank subsidiaries, regardless
of the formalities of corporat e separation. 37
deposit insurance programs encouraged uninsured depositors and other creditors to monitor the safety and
soundness of most EU banks. However, the study also determined that the new EU programs did not
reduce risk-taking among banks classified as TBT F (a category including each ba nk that accounted for
more than 12% of the banking assets in its country of incorporation). Evidently, uninsured depositors and
other creditors of major European banks continued to believe that they would receive full protection, and
they therefore did not effectively monitor risk-taking by major banks. Reint Gropp & Jukka M. Vesala,
Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard: Does the Counterfactual Matter?, European Central Bank Working
Paper No. 47, July 2001 (available at <www.ecb.int./pub>), at 2-3, 8-12, 17-24.
See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part III(C)(1) (describing the GLB Act’s
“firewalls” and the practical difficulties inherent in enforcing those restrictions); id. Part III(B)(2)
(discussing factors that have caused banks to support their nonbank affiliates); Anthony Cornyn et al., An
Analysis of the Concept of Corporate Separateness in BHC Regulation from an Economic Perspective, in
PROC EED INGS O F A CONF. ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 174, 185-93 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi.,
IL, 1986) (describing situations in which banks decided to rescue their nonbank affiliates in order to
preserve their reputations and avoid a loss of public confidence); Keith R. Fisher, Reweaving the Safety
Net: Bank Diversification into Securities and Insurance Activities, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 123, 227-31
(1992) (same); Mark J. Flannery, Contagious Bank Runs, Financial Structure and Corporate Separateness
within a Bank Holding Company, in P ROC EED INGS O F A CONF. ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION
213 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., IL, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Flannery, Corporate Separateness], at 217-23
(describing the reputational concerns and fears of “contagion within a holding company” that provide
strong incentives for bank holding companies to rescue their troubled nonbank subsidiaries).
37

During his testimony at a congressional hearing in 1981, Walter Wr iston (then chair man of
Citicorp) famously declar ed that “it is inconceivable that any major bank would walk away from any
subsidiary of its holding company. If your name is on the door, all of your capital funds are going to be
behind it in the real world. Lawyers can say you have separ ation, but the marketplace is persuasive, and it
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Moreover, in recent years major banks have deliberately increased their reputational stake
in nonbank affiliates t hrough market ing campaigns that promote unitary “brand names” covering
their ent ire holding companies. The leading U.S. banking organizations have also coordinated the
activities of their banking and nonbanking subsidiaries by combining banking products with
related nonbanking services (e.g., syndicated lending and securities underwriting). As a result, the
profits, losses and risks of various units within a financial holding company are likely to be more
closely correlated than a comparable group of independent firms.38
Accordingly, federal regulators will be inclined to prevent the failure of a nonbank affiliate
of a major financial conglomerate, because of concerns that the affiliate’s default could trigger a
contagious “run” by all of the conglomerate’s investors and creditors. Under conditions of
widespread economic distress – when financial firms are most vulnerable to a loss of public
confidence – regulators would understandably fear that the collapse of a large financial holding
company could trigger a systemic “flight to safety” in the financial markets. During financial

would not see it that way.” Quoted in Cornyn et al., supra, at 191, 207 n.52.
See Flannery, Corporate Separateness, supr a note ___, at 214, 223-25; Mark J. Flannery,
Modernizing Financial Regulation: The Relation Between Interbank Transactions and Supervisory Reform,
16 J. Fin. Serv. Res. 101 (1999) [hereina fter cited as Flannery, Financial Regulation], at 103-09; Helen A.
Garten, Subtle Hazards, Financial Risks, and Diversified Banks: An Essay on the Perils of Regulatory
Reform, 49 Md. L. Rev. 314 (1990) [hereinafter cited as Garten, Subtle Hazards], at 346-51, 361-62, 36667, 382; Anthony M. Santomero & David L. Eckles, The Determinants of Success in the New Financial
Services Environment, 6 Econ. Pol’y Rev. No. 4, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Oct. 2000, at 15, 18.
38

For example, Citigroup recently decided to market all of its globa l corpora te and investment
banking services under the brand name of “Citigroup Corporate and Investment Bank.” Citigroup
executives declared that the new brand name would be “built around an aggressive, coordinated advertising
and communication plan” that would “bring further clarity to our identity in the marketplace and among
our clients.” Paul Beckett, So Long, Poker Players: Salomon Is History, Wall St. J., May 23, 2001, at C18
(quoting Michael Carpenter and Sanford Weill). This unified branding strategy certainly incr eases the
likelihood that Citigroup will feel obliged to use the resources of its entire holding company to satisfy
future liabilities created by its commercial banking and investment banking subsidiaries.
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disruptions, federal regulators are likely to conclude that they must protect nonbank affiliates of
big financial conglomerates in order to reduce the risk of a systemic crisis.39
In a recent report, financial regulators from the “Gro up of Ten” developed nations
recognized the strong possibility that large financial conglomerates do create greater “systemic
risk” (viz., the risk that the failure of a major financial institution will severely disrupt the financial
system and have adverse “spillover” effects on the general economy).40 The report pointed to the
emergence in the United States of “large complex banking organizations” (“LCBOs”), which
engage in a wide range of banking and nonbanking activities and are managed on a highly
integrated and centralized basis. The growing consolidation of financial assets within LCBOs has
(i) increased the complexity of major financial institutions, making it harder for regulators and
market participants to comprehend in a timely manner the risks inherent in LCBOs, (ii) produced

See Thomas M. Hoenig, Financial Industry Megamergers and Policy Challenges, 84 Econ.
Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of K.C., MO, 3d Qtr. 1999, at 7-8, 10-13 (speech by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City’s president); KAUFMAN , ON MONEY AND MARKETS, supra note 34, at 207, 237-38; Frederic
S. Mishkin, Financial consolidation: Dangers and opportunities, 23 J. Banking & Fin. 675, 680-81 (1999);
Santomero & Eckles, supra note 38, at 15, 18-19 (speech co-authored by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia’s president); Gary H. Stern, Thoughts on Designing Credible Policies After Financial
Modernization, 14 Region No. 3, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, MN, Sept. 2000, at 4-5, 24-25 (remarks
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis’ president); Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts
I(D)(4)(b)(iv) & III(C)(3).
39

See GRO UP O F TEN , REPORT ON CONSOLIDATION IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR , Jan. 2001
(available at <www.bis.org>) [hereinafter cited as GRO UP O F TEN CONSOLIDATION REPORT ], at 1 & n.1
(stating that this report was prepared by staff members of the finance ministr ies and/or central bank staff of
Austra lia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden Switzerland,
the United Kingdom and the United States, along with representatives of the International Monetary Fund
and several other international organiza tions). “Systemic risk” refers to the risk that (1) the collapse of one
or more financial firms will disrupt the financia l system by causing failures of other financia l institutions
(either directly, through defaults on interbank obligations, or indirectly, through a generalized loss of public
confidence that results in desta bilizing “runs” on other financial institutions), and (2) the disruption of the
financial system will impair the general economy by (a) cutting off credit flows to businesses and
consumers, and/or (B) causing a sharp depreciation in asset values that increases economic uncerta inty and
discourages investment. Id. at 126-27.
40
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a higher concentration and correlation of credit and market risks among the largest financial
institutions, due to their growing domination of the markets for interbank loans, OTC derivatives
and investment banking services, and (iii) pro duced close linkages between banking and
nonbanking subsidiaries of financial holding companies, thereby complicating the problem of
resolving the failure of a major bank in isolation from its closely linked nonbank affiliates. The
report noted that regulators facing the potential failure of an LCBO might well deem it necessary
to invoke the “systemic risk” authority that permits the FDIC to protect uninsured creditors of a
large failing bank.41
Similarly, a senior official at Moody’s Investors Services, one of the two largest securities
rating agencies, has declared that the threat of “financial panic” should cause federal regulators to
support big financial conglomerat es during “times of extreme financial stress.” In his view, the
TBTF status of major financial holding companies is undeniable – it is “like the elephant at the
picnic – everyone is aware of it, but no one wants to mention it.”42
In sum, the growth of big financial holding companies increases the likelihood that major

See id. at 132-46. See also Gianni De Nicolo & Myron L. Kwast, Systemic Risk and Financial
Consolidation: Are They Related?, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Ser.
Working Paper 2001-33, June 19, 2001 (available at <www.federalreserve.gov>) (concluding that the
rapidly growing market share held by LCBOs in the U.S. banking industry during 1988-99 probably
increased systemic risk, because of closer financial linkages and higher risk correlations among LCBOs);
Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(D)(4)(b)(iv) (discussing the FDIC’s authority, under 12
U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G), to protect uninsured creditors of a bank whose failure could create systemic risk).
41

Christopher T. Mahoney, Commentary, 6 Econ. Pol’y Rev. No. 4, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Oct.
2000, at 55, 57-58. Federal regulators frequently disclaim any intent to follow a TBTF policy in dealing
with the possible failure of a major financial institution. See Kenneth H. Thomas, Fed’s ‘Too Big to Fail’
Stance Curious in the Megabank Era, Am. Banker, July 27, 2001, at 9 (noting statements by FRB
chairman Alan Greenspan and vice chairman Roger Ferguson). Nevertheless, Alan Blinder, a former FRB
vice chairman, has candidly acknowledged that “[e]verybody knows that there are institutions that are so
large and so interlinked with others that it is out of the question to let them fail.” Id.
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segments of the securities and life insurance industries will be brought within the scope of the
TBTF doctrine, thereby expanding the scope and cost of federal “safety net” guarantees.43 This
de facto extension of the federal safety net is likely to be very costly during future financial crises.
For example, during 1980-94, U.S. taxpayers and deposit insurance funds paid out almost $200
billion to resolve the failures of 3,000 banks and thrift institutions.44
The United States has hardly been alone in encountering financial disruptions during the

The federal “safety net” for banks consists of deposit insurance, protection of uninsured
depositors and creditors of big banks under the TBTF policy, discount window advances provided by the
FRB as LOLR, and the FRB’s guarantee of interba nk payments made on Fedwire. Many regulators and
analysts have concluded that (i) the federal sa fety net provides a valuable net subsidy to banks (i.e., the
safety net confers benefits that exceed the costs of complying with federal bank regulations), and (ii) this
subsidy grows much larger in times of financial crisis. The existence of a long-term net subsidy is
supported by data showing that financial markets permit banks (especially the largest banks that are
presumptively TBT F) to (A) pay interest rates on deposits that are substantially lower than market rates
paid by nonbank companies on short-term, uninsured debt, and (B) operate with capital ratios that are
significantly lower than those held by competing financial intermediaries, such as commercial and
consumer finance companies and life insurers. The value of the federal subsidy is also indicated by the fact
that no major bank has ever surrendered its charter and chosen to operate as a nonbank. See Allen N.
Berger, Richard J. Herring & Giorgio P. Szegö, The role of capital in financial institutions, 19 J. Banking
& Fin. 393, 400-06 (1995); Frederick Furlong, Federal Subsidies in Banking: The Link to Financial
Modernization, FRBSF Econ. Letter No. 97-31, Fed. Res. Bank of S.F., CA, Oct. 24, 1997; KAUFMAN ,
ON MONEY AND MARKETS, supr a note 34, at 239-40; Myron L. Kwast & S. Wayne Passmore, The
Subsidy Provided by the Federal Safety Net: Theory and Evidence, 16 J. Fin. Serv. Res. 35 passim (1999);
John R. Walter, Can a Safety Net Be Contained?, 84 Econ. Q. No. 1, Fed. Res. Bank of Rich., VA, Winter
1998, at 1, 2-11. See also Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Debunking Debanking: Idea Sounds Interesting But
Examine the Costs, Am. Banker, Sept. 29, 1997, at 1, 4 (explaining that a bank which surrendered its
charter would lose significant benefits, because (i) an institution without access to the Federal Reserve’s
payments system would lose “[t]he ability to quickly and efficiently move large amounts of money,” and
(ii) an institution without deposit insura nce would “[pay] more to attr act funds . . . [and] would risk losing
customers looking for safety”).
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For a contrasting perspective, questioning whether the federal safety net provides benefits to banks
that are greater than the accompanying costs of r egulation, see, e.g., Kenneth Jones & Barr y Kolatch, The
Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and Implications for Financial Modernization, 12 FDIC Banking
Rev. No. 1, at 1, 2-12 (1999) (agreeing that the federal safety net provides a gross subsidy to banks, but
arguing that any net subsidy is small in view of the costs of bank regulation).
See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(E)(1) & I(E)(2) (b)(iii)(D) (reviewing the
costs of resolving bank and thrift failures during 1980-94).
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past two decades. More than 130 countries experienced serious banking problems during 198095, while East Asia and Russia suffered devastating financial crises during 1997-98. Many of
these recent financial crises occurred after governments deregulated their financial sectors and
failed to exercise adequate supervisory oversight, while continuing to provide explicit or implicit
guarantees for bank liabilities. The resulting moral hazard encouraged excessive risk-taking,
leading to “boom-and-bust cycles” that ultimately destroyed the solvency of major financial
institutions. In addition, most financial crises resulted in costly expenditures of government funds
to recapitalize or liquidate failing banks. The United States spent almost 3% of its gross domestic
product (“GDP”) in resolving its thrift crisis, while other countries have suffered losses ranging
from 10-40% of GDP as a result of financial disruptions.45
Thus, the past t wo decades provide compelling evidence of the dangers inherent in
liberalizing the powers of financial institutions without taking adequate steps to remove the moral
hazard problems that encourage excessive risk-taking. Recently, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch
have demonstrated the ability of large financial conglomerates to exploit the subsidy provided by
federal deposit insurance. During 2000, both companies established “sweep” pro grams enabling
customers to switch funds from their uninsured securities brokerage accounts into FDIC-insured
deposit acco unts at affiliated banks. By April 2001, brokerage customers of Merrill Lynch and

See, e.g., Ben Bernanke & Mar k Gertler, Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility, 84 Econ.
Rev. No. 4, Fed. Res. Bank of K.C., MO, 4th Qtr. 1999, at 17, 17-21; Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco,
A Model of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets, 116 Q. J. Econ. 489 passim (2001); Richar d J. Herring
& Anthony M. Santomero, What Is Optimal Financial Regulation?, in NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE ,
supra note 28, at 51, 60; George G. Kaufman, Banking and currency crises and systemic risk: Lessons
from recent events, 24 Econ. Perspectives No. 3, Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., IL, 3d Qtr. 2000, at 9 [hereina fter
cited as Kaufman, Banking Crises], at 9-20; KAUFMAN , ON MONEY AND MARKETS, supra note 34, at 5960, 223-46; Michael Moskow, Disruptions in global financial markets: The role of public policy, 24 Econ.
Perspectives No. 3, Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., IL, 3d Qtr. 2000, at 2, 2-5.
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Citigroup had used these “sweep” programs to transfer over $75 billion into insured deposit
accounts. Both companies indicated that their new FDIC-insured deposits would be used, in part,
to provide funding for t he activities of their nonbank subsidiaries. For example, when a
spokesman for Merrill Lynch was asked what his company would do with its “newfound low-cost
funds,” he replied that the company’s deposits would give it “flexibility . . . to finance other parts
of our business.”46
The Citigroup and Merrill Lynch sweep programs also reveal how current banking laws
permit large financial conglomerates with multiple bank subsidiaries to expand the level of deposit
insurance offered to each customer. Merrill Lynch’s brokerage customers can obtain up to
$200,000 of deposit insurance coverage by making structured transfers to t wo affiliated banks,
while Citigroup’s brokerage customers can secure up to $600,000 of deposit insurance coverage
by making similar transfers to six affiliated banks. Because the banks owned by Merrill Lynch and
Citigroup are “well managed” and “well capitalized” under current regulatory standards, both
companies receive free deposit insurance for the consumer deposits created by their sweep
programs. 47 Other financial holding companies are likely to establish similar programs, because
Richard Melville, Deposit Power: Where Merrill, B of A, Citi Agree, Am. Banker, Dec. 18,
2000, at 1 (quoting James Wiggins of Merrill Lynch, and also reporting that Citigroup was expected to use
its deposit sweep program to generate low-cost financing for the consumer lending business of its newlyacquired subsidiary, Associates First Capital). See also Charles Gasparino, Fund Track: Merrill Lynch’s
Small Investors Face Rate Cut, Wall St. J., April 30, 2001, at C1 (stating that, unlike assets held in its
money market mutual funds, Merrill Lynch “can legally lend out its bank deposits, and pocket the interestrate spread between what it pays on the deposits and what it charges investors”); Rob Blackwell, Merrill,
Solly Put $28B Into Insured Accounts, Am. Banker, April 19, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter Blackwell, Deposit
Sweeps] (reporting that, as of Mar. 31, 2001, Merrill Lynch’s sweep program had created nearly $60
billion in new FDIC-insured bank deposits and Citigroup’s program had created $17 billion of such
deposits).
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See Gasparino, supra note 46; Blackwell, Deposit Sweeps, supr a note 46; Wilmarth,
Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(C) (explaining that, since 1996, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
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financial executives and analysts recognize the significant funding advantage provided to banks
by their ability to collect low-cost, FDIC-insured deposits. 48
Financial holding companies will thus have both opportunities and incentives to use their
banking subsidiaries’ access to the federal safety net to provide cross-subsidies to their nonbank
affiliates. Many analysts have concluded that (i) banks have incentives to transfer a portion of
their safety net subsidies to nonbank affiliates, and (ii) while current federal regulations attempt to
inhibit such transfers, they cannot prevent them entirely. Transfers of safety net subsidies will
inhibit market discipline and encourage greater risk-taking among financial holding companies.
Indeed, the risk-enhancing effects of cross-subsidization are likely to offset any risk reduction
created by diversification as banks combine with securities firms and life insurance companies.49
3.

Greater Consolidation of Risk within the Financial Services Industry

Perhaps the greatest danger of the movement toward financial conglomeration is that it

(“FDI Act”) has effectively prevented the FDIC from charging any deposit insurance premiums to “well
capitalized” and “well managed” banks, which account for more than 90% of all U.S. banks).
See Steven Pearlstein & Peter Pae, Megabank Day, Wash. Post, April 19, 1998, at H1 (citing
Bank One chairman John McCoy’s view that “access to consumer deposits . . . amounted to cheap capital”
for big banks); Matthias Rieker, Banks Seen Missing T he Boat by Failing to Generate Deposits, Am.
Banker, Apr il 5, 2001, at 2 (reporting that, according to James McCormick of First Manhattan Consulting
Group, consumer deposit accounts produced 51% of total U.S . bank revenues and 66% of total U.S. bank
pretax profits in 1999).
48

See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 37, at 226-30; Garten, Subtle Hazards, supra note 38, at 353-64,
376-81; Jones & Kolatch, supra note 43, at 12-14; Kane, Megamerger Incentives, supra note 36, at 68994; Walter, supra note 43, at 10-13; GAO Says Banks May Pass Net Subsidy To Their Affiliates, 16
Banking Pol’y Rep. No. 18, Sept. 15, 1997, at 7 [hereinafter cited as GAO Bank Subsidy Report], at 8-9
(reprinting excerpts of letter from GAO Chief Economist James Bothwell to Rep. Richard Baker). See also
infra Part II(A)(1) (discussing ways in which banks can shift their federal subsidy to affiliates despite the
existence of regulatory firewalls); Santomero & Eckles, supra note 38, at 18-19 (concluding that “universal
banking does present a new way in which government-induced moral hazard can manifest itself . . . [and]
can be passed down to nonbank subsidiaries owned by universal banks”).
49

29

will increase the concentration of credit risk and market risk within the U.S. financial system. By
authorizing unlimited combinations between banks and nonbank financial firms, the GLB Act has
largely removed the alternative financing channels that the U.S. financial system contained – and
that acted as “shock absorbers” for the U.S. economy – prior to 1999. For example, the FRB
mobilized leading U.S. banks to counteract serious disruptions in the capital markets during t he
Penn Central commercial paper crisis of 1970, the Hunt Brothers silver crisis of 1980, the stock
market crash of 1987 and the Russian debt crisis of 1998. In each case, major banks provided
emergency credit that enabled large nonbank firms to avoid bankruptcy or severe distress. Banks
were able to serve as standby sources of liquidity and credit on each occasion, because their
capital markets activities represented a relatively small portion of their overall operations and did
not expose them to devastating losses. Conversely, the securities industry provided financing that
helped to revive the U.S. economy after the recession and banking crisis of 1990-91, because
securities firms were not crippled by the LDC and real estate lending problems that afflicted major
banks at that time.50 In sum, the legal barriers separating banks and securities firms prior to 1999
reduced systemic risk in the U.S. economy by (i) insulating each sector to a substantial degree
from the other’s problems, and (ii) allowing each sector to act as an alternative source of
financing while the other recovered from serious financial losses.51
In cont rast, consider the record of Japan during the 1990's. In 1990, the Japanese banking

See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(A)(2)(b), I(E)(2)(b)(iii)(G), and III(B);
Remarks by FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan before the World Bank Group and the IMF Program of
Seminars, Sept. 27, 1999 (available at <www.federalreserve.gov>) [hereinafter cited as 1999 Greenspan
IMF Speech], at 1-3.
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See Kaufman, Banking Architecture, supra note 28, at 44; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra
note 12, Part III(B).
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system had massive exposures to both the real estate market and the stock market. Japanese
banks made huge amounts of loans secured by real estate and securities, and t hey also held
extensive portfolios of corporate stocks, due primarily to cross-shareholding relationships within
their respective corporate groups (keiretsu). Beginning in 1990, the Japanese real estate and
stock markets both collapsed, with prices in each sector falling by two-thirds or more. Due to
staggering losses caused by bad loans and falling stock values, two of the twenty largest Japanese
banks failed and several other big banks were driven to the brink of insolvency. Two major
securities firms and three large insurance companies also failed. After a decade of hugely
expensive programs, the Japanese government has not yet succeeded in its efforts to stimulate t he
economy and restore t he financial system. The Japanese economy has remained stuck in a
prolonged slump, due in large part to the inability of banks to provide credit needed by Japanese
business firms. Banks are still severely weakened by nonperforming loans and depreciated stocks,
and the securities markets have not sustained any prolonged rally. By the autumn of 2001, Japan
faced a floundering economy and a fragile banking system, along with record debt levels that
made it extremely difficult for the Japanese government to finance new assistance programs.52
For discussions of the collapse of the Japanese real estate and stock markets since 1990, and the
resulting impact on the Japanese economy and financial system, see, e.g., Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale,
Bubbles and Crises, 110 Econ. J. 236, 236-38, 252-54 (2000) Valentine V. Craig, Japanese Banking: A
Time of Crisis, 11 FDIC Banking Rev. No. 2, at 9, 12-17 (1998); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Japan’s Experience
with Deposit Insurance and Failing Banks: Implications for Financial Regulatory Design?, 77 Wash. U. L.
Q. 399, 413-24 (1999); Joe Peek & Er ic S. Rosengren, Japanese Banking Problems: Implications for
Lending in the United States, New Eng. Econ. Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, MA, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 25
[hereinafter cited as Peek and Rosengren, Japanese Banking Pr oblems], at 25-31; Wilmarth, Big Bank
Mergers, supra note 26, at 62-69.
52

By the end of 2000, the Japanese government had spent more than $1 trillion in its efforts to
stimulate the economy (primar ily through public works projects and temporary tax cuts). See Bill Spindle,
Japan’s Massive Debt Bomb Ticks Ever Louder, Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 2000, at A27. In addition, the
government had spent more than $200 billion, and had budgeted an additional $350 billion, to protect bank
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Many observers have blamed Japan’s failure to resolve its banking and economic
problems on the unwillingness of its political and business leaders to push for a fundamental
restructuring of Japan’s financial system and general econo my.53 Resistance to change
undoubtedly accounts for a major part of Japan’s continuing difficulties. However, the role of
Japanese banks as dominant providers of business finance, and their exposure to both credit risk in

depositors and recapitalize the banking system. Finally, the government had spent further billions of
dollars in “price-keeping operations” designed to support the stock market. See Craig, supra, at 50;
Milhaupt, supra, at 421-24; Phred Dvorak & Peter Landers, Is Japan on the Verge of a Contagious
Financial Crisis?, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 2001, at A14 (“Financial Safety Net” tbl.).
For descriptions of the grave fiscal and economic problems and the unresolved banking crisis that
confronted Japan in 2001, see, e.g., Ken Belson, Japan: This Time, It Could Get Nasty, Bus. Week, Jan.
15, 2001, at 52 (stating that the Japanese government would be “hard-pressed” to finance additional
stimulus programs for its struggling economy, because Japan’s national debt had already reached $5.8
trillion, or 141% of its gross domestic product, amounting to “the industrialized world’s largest fiscal
deficit”); Japan’s Economy: Another false dawn?, Economist, Mar. 24, 2001, at 79, 80-81 (reporting that
(i) Japanese banks had written off about $600 billion of nonperforming loans during the prior decade, but
they still held that much or more in bad loans on their balance sheets, because “good loans [were] souring
as fast as banks can provision against them or write them off,” and (ii) while Japanese banks had
previously relied on unrealized gains in their “huge equity portfolios” to offset their loan charge-offs, those
stock portfolios had become “full of losses” as the Japanese stock market “hover[ed] near a 16-year low”);
Phred Dvorak, Corporate Bankruptcies in Japan Hit Record High, Wall St. J., April 16, 2001, at A12
(reporting that Japanese corporations with over $200 billion in unpaid liabilities had declared bankruptcy
during the previous year); Japan’s economy: Chronic sickness, Economist, June 2, 2001, at 71,71 (stating
that Japan’s economy had posted “the worst ten-year performance of any big economy in the past halfcentury”); Japan’s banks: Out for the count, Economist, Oct. 11, 2001 (reporting that Japan appeared to be
on the brink of a major banking crisis, because a “deepening recession” had caused “bad loans . . . to soar”
along with “plunging share prices” that were eroding the capital of Japanese banks).
See, e. g., Cra ig, supra note 50, at 14-17; Milhaupt, supra note 50, at 408-24; Michael Williams
et al., Day of Reckoning: Wall Street Intensifies Japan’s Woes, but They All Trace Back to Home, Wall
St. J., Mar . 16, 2001, at A1. In June 2001, a new Japanese government, under the leader ship of Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi, issued a preliminary outline of structural reforms intended to address Japan’s
longstanding economic and financial problems. However, analysts questioned whether Mr. Koizumi (i)
could overcome well-entrenched opponents of reform among Japan’s business leaders, politicians and
bureaucrats, and (ii) would retain his political popularity if his reforms, as expected, caused sharp
increases in unemployment and corporate bankruptcies. See, e. g., Brian Bremner, Will Koizumi’s Reforms
Be as Tough as His Talk?, Bus. Week, Aug. 6, 2001, at 45; Clay Chandler, Tokyo Unveils Reform
Str ategy, Wash. Post, June 22, 2001, at E1; Neil A. Martin, Will Japan’s Koizumi Soon Be Ex-Prime
Minister?, Barron’s, Sept. 10, 2001, at MW10.
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the real estate market and investment risk in the securities markets, help to explain the severity
and protracted nature of the Japanese crisis. The Japanese financial system concentrated business
financing, credit risk and investment risk within its major banks. As a result, the simultaneous
collapse of Japan’s real estate and stock markets crippled the banks and left no substantial
alternative source of financing for Japanese businesses.54
The Japanese experience provides a warning signal about the systemic risk implications of
universal banking. Based on merger patterns among domestic and foreign financial institutions
since 1990, the GLB Act could spur a consolidation of much of the U.S. banking, securities and
life insurance industries into a small group of big universal banks. In addition, as noted above,
most financial conglomerat es are centrally managed and co ordinate the activities of their nonbank
subsidiaries with core operations of their lead banks (e.g., by combining securities underwriting
with syndicated lending for the same corporat e clients). The financial markets and bank
regulators therefore view these conglomerates as highly integrated enterprises, despite the GLB
Act’s mandates for corporate veils and regulatory firewalls between their various subsidiaries.55
Thus, the trend toward cross-indust ry consolidation will increase the concentration and
potential correlation of credit risk and market risk in the U.S. financial system. As a result, (i)
widespread defaults on bank loans or OTC derivatives will have undermine investo r confidence in

See Craig, supra note 50, at 9-14; 1999 Greenspan IMF Speech, supra note 48, at 2; Peek &
Rosengren, Japanese Banking Problems, supra note 50, at 26-31; Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note
26, at 62-63, 69 n.319.
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See supra note 38 and accompanying text; Lisa M. DeFerrari & David E. Palmer, Supervision
of Large Complex Banking Organizations, 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 47, 51-53 (2001); Santomero & Eckles,
supra note 38, at 15, 18; U.S. Gen. Accounting Off., Risk-Focused Bank Examinations: Regulators of
Large Banking Organizations Face Challenges, GAO/GGD-00-48, Jan. 2000 [hereinafter cited as GAO
LCBO Study], at 5, 15, 24, 28-30.
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securities firms that are affiliated with banks, and (ii) stock market crashes will have direct
spillover effects on banks that are affiliated with securities firms. In short, the growth of large
financial holding companies will probably increase the risks of contagion within the financial
system, thereby intensifying pressures for TBTF bailouts during financial disruptions.56
II.

Current Regulatory Efforts Are Inadequate to Control the Risk-Taking Incentives
of Financial Conglomerates
The current federal supervisory regime attempts to control the risks of LCBOs by

pursuing a four-pronged strategy. First, the GLB Act requires financial holding companies to
conduct securities, insurance and merchant banking activities in nonbank subsidiaries that are
separately incorporated, separately capitalized and insulated by regulatory “firewalls” from their
affiliated banks.57 Second, the GLB Act declares that all banks in a financial holding company
must be “well capitalized,” and FDICIA mandates a regime of “prompt corrective action”
(“PCA”) for any bank that fails to meet prescribed capital standards.58 Third, the GLB Act
requires all banks in a financial holding company to be “well managed,” and the FRB and OCC
have instituted new supervisory procedures for evaluating the effectiveness of each LCBO’s
See Hoenig, supr a note 39, at 10-13; Remarks by FRB Governor Laurence H. Meyer before a
Nat’l Bur. of Econ. Res. Conf., Jan. 14, 2000 (<available at www.federalreserve.gov>) [hereinafter cited
as 2000 Meyer NBER Speech], at 1-2; Santomero & Eckles, supra note 38, at 15-16, 18-20; Stern, supra
note 39, at 4-5, 24-26. See also Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 31, at 986-1004 (contending that
large bank mergers create joint failure risks and increase the likelihood of TBTF bailouts).
56

See S. Rep. No. 44, supra note 21, at 7-8; H.R. Rep. No. 74, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. 133-35
(1999); MC COY , supra note 3, § 6.05; O’Neal, supra note 2, at 100-12.
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For a discussion of the GLB Act’s provisions, see H.R. Rep. No. 434, 106th Cong., 1st. Sess.
155, 159-60 (1999) (Conf. Rep.); O’Neal, supra note 2, at 104-05, 108, 112 (same). For a discussion of
FDICIA’s “prompt corrective action” program for undercapitalized banks, see, e.g., George J. Benston &
George G. Kaufman, FDICIA After Five Years, 11 J. Econ. Perspectives 139, 144-49 (1997); U.S. Gen.
Accounting Off., Bank and Thrift Regulation: Implementation of FDICIA’s Prompt Regulatory Action
Provisions, GAO/GGD-97-18, Nov. 1996 [hereinafter cited as GAO PCA Study], at 14-21, 25-27.
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management.59 Fourth, Congress and regulators are taking steps to encourage greater market
discipline of LCBOs. For example, the GLB Act requires major banks to issue investment-grade
debt securities if they wish to establish direct financial subsidiaries.60
This regulatory philosophy is consistent with a new capital adequacy proposal issued in
January 2001 by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision. The Basel Committee’s 2001
proposal recommends a new regulatory framework based on “three pillars” – minimum capital
requirements, enhanced supervisory review procedures and market discipline. As indicated
above, these “three pillars” reflect policies that are already being implemented by U.S. bank
regulators for LCBOs. 61 Regarding the first “pillar” of capital requirements, the Basel
See H.R. Rep. No. 434, supra note 58, at 155, 159-60 (discussing the GLB Act’s “well
managed” requirement); O’Neal, supra note 2, at 104-05, 108, 112 (same). For descriptions of the FRB’s
and OCC’s new supervisory procedures for LCBOs, see generally DeFerrari & Palmer, supra note 55;
2000 Meyer NBER Speech, supr a note 56; Remarks by Governor Laurence H. Meyer at the Int’l Banking
Conf. of the Fed. Fin. Institutions Examination Council, May 31, 2000 (available at
<www.federalreserve.gov>) [hereinafter cited as 2000 Meyer FFIEC Speech]; GAO LCBO Study, supra
note 55.
59

See O’Neal, supra note 2, at 109 (explaining provision of GLB Act requiring a national bank to
have at least one issue of outstanding debt securities rated in one of the top three rating categories by a
national recognized rating agency if the bank wishes to establish a financial subsidiary and is one of the 50
largest U.S. banks). See also Meyer , NBER Speech, supra note 54, at 2-6 (arguing for measures
encouraging greater market discipline over LCBOs; Meyer FFIEC Speech, supra note 59, at 3-4 (same).
60

See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Overview of The New Basel Capital Accord, Jan.
2001 (available at <www.bis.org>) [hereinafter cited as 2001 Basel Capital Proposal Overview], at 1,7,
12-36. See also 2000 Meyer NBER Speech, supra note 56, at 2-3 (explaining that federal bank regulators
were already implementing supervisory policies that were consistent with the “three pillars” of the Basel
Committee’s new capital adequacy proposal, as originally set forth in a 1999 concept paper).
61

In June 2001, responding to widespr ead criticism of its January proposal, the Ba sel Committee
extended its timetable for adopting and implementing its new capital accord. However, the Committee
stressed that “it remains str ongly committed to the three pillars architecture of the new Accord and to the
broad objective of improving the risk sensitivity of the minimum capital requirements.” Basel Comm. on
Bank Supervision, Update on the New Basel Capital Accord, 25 June 2001 (available at <www.bis.org>)
[hereinafter cited as June 2001 Basel Update]. See also Richard Cowden & Daniel Pruzin, Basel Panel
Extends Proposal Time Line, Taking Pressure Off Consultation Process, 77 BNA’s Banking Rep. 33
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Committee’s new proposal incorporates two new approaches that have been pursued by U.S.
bank regulators: (i) applying capital requirements on a consolidated basis to the entire financial
holding company (including nonbank subsidiaries), and (ii) establishing capital requirements for
each LCBO in accordance with internal risk ratings that have been developed by the LCBO’s
managers and reviewed by bank regulators. 62
Unfortunately, as discussed below, all four elements of the present U.S. supervisory
program for LCBOs have exhibited serious shortcomings in the past. Accordingly, current
regulat ory approaches are unlikely to prevent financial conglomerates from engaging in excessive
risk-taking at the expense of the federal safety net.
A.

The Ineffectiveness of Corporate Separation as a Risk Control Device

Supervisory requirements based on the concept of corporate separation are in fundamental
conflict with the actual behavior of financial holding companies. Most LCBOs operate as unitary
enterprises, based on centralized capital allocation and risk management policies that disregard
formal structural divisions between corporat e subsidiaries. On many occasions, financial holding
companies have rescued nonbank affiliates or their customers in order to protect the reputations

(2001).
Under the Basel Committee’s proposal, only large, sophisticated banks that establish
satisfactory internal risk management systems would be permitted to use internal risk ratings to calculate
their capital requirements. Smaller banks would continue to comply with uniform, standardized capital
rules established by the Basel Committee. See 2001 Basel Capital Proposal Overview, supra note 61, at 12, 7-8, 11-17; 2000 Meyer NBER Speech, supra note 56, at 1-3. See also H.R. Rep. No. 434, supra note
58, at 157-59 (explaining that the GLB Act authorizes the FRB, as “umbrella supervisor,” to establish
consolidated capital requirements for financial holding companies and their subsidiaries, although the FRB
may not change the separate capital rules established by primary regulators for “functionally regulated”
subsidiaries, such as banks, securities firms and insurance companies).
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of the parent holding company and its regulated financial institutions. 63 In the most serious cases,
holding company managers have deliberately violated regulatory firewalls by exceeding the legal
limits on financial support that banks or other regulated financial institution may provide to
troubled affiliates.64
The GLB Act relies on Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act to prevent
abusive transactions between banks and t heir nonbank affiliates within the new financial holding
company structure. 65 However, regulators and analysts have acknowledged that (i) the
restrictions mandated by Sections 23A and 23B are complicated and difficult to enforce, and (ii)
See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts
III(B) & III(C)(1).
63

See, e.g., Cornyn et al., supra note 37, at 186 (describing how Hamilton National Bank failed in
the mid-1970's after its parent holding company forced the bank, in violation of legal restrictions on
affiliate transa ctions, to purchase large amounts of low-quality mortgages from its troubled mortgage
banking affiliate); Garten, Subtle Hazards, supra note 38, at 353-54 (same, and noting that Continental
Bank ignored legal lending limits by extending credit to rescue its options tr ading subsidiary during the
October 1987 stock market crash); William S. Haraf, The Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert: Lessons
for the Bank Regulators, Regulation (Cato Rev. of Bus. & Gov’t), Winter 1991, at 22, 23 (stating that,
when Drexel Burnham was threatened with failure in early 1990, it withdrew capital from its regulated
securities subsidiaries in excess of regulatory limits until the SEC intervened to prevent further capital
transfers).
64

See H.R. Rep. No. 74, supra note 57, at 134-35; Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys.,
Transactions Between Banks and Their Affiliates: Notice of proposed rulemaking, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,186
(2001) [hereinafter cited as FRB Proposed Affiliate Transaction Rule], at 24,186.
65

Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act prohibits an FDIC-insured bank from engaging in
“covered transactions” with nonbank affiliates (e.g., extensions of credit to affiliates or purchases of
securities or assets from affiliates) in an amount greater than (i) 10% of the bank’s capital stock and
surplus for any single affiliate, or (ii) 20% of its capital stock and sur plus for all affiliates. In addition,
extensions of credit to affiliates must be secured by qualifying collateral. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c &
1828(j)(1); FRB Proposed Affiliate Transaction Rule, supra, at 24,186-87.
Section 23B generally requires that any transaction between an FDIC-insured bank and a nonbank
affiliate must be conducted on terms (including credit standards) comparable to arm’s length transactions
with non-affiliated companies. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c-1 & 1828(j)(1); FRB Proposed Affiliate
Transaction Rule, supra, at 24,187.
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managerial evasions of those provisions are often subtle and hard t o detect. As a result, when a
financial holding company or some of its subsidiaries are under severe financial stress, regulators
may fail to discover and prevent a transfer of bank funds or bank credit that violates regulatory
limits. Moreover, to avert a systemic financial crisis, regulators may decide to waive Section 23A
and 23B so that major banks can help their troubled affiliates. For example, in September 2001,
regulators reportedly suspended Section 23A and encouraged leading banks to transfer funds to
securities affiliates to head off a threatened liquidity crunch following the terrorist attack on the
World Trade Center.66
Thus, federal bank regulators currently appear to give little weight to the concept of
corporate separation as an effective risk control device. Regulators understand that large financial
holding companies operate in accordance with centralized business strategies and risk
management systems that transcend corporate boundaries between affiliates. Regulators therefore
are now stressing the importance of supervising financial holding companies in a consolidated
manner that cuts across corporate divisions among banks subsidiaries and their nonbank

For discussions of the difficulties regulators face in enforcing limitations on affiliate
transactions, see Fisher, supra note 37, at 229-30; Garten, Subtle Hazards, supra note 38, at 380-81
(sta ting that the “[FRB] has admitted that restrictions on interaffiliate funds transfers frequently have been
violated or interpreted creatively by management in times of stress”); GAO Bank Subsidy Report, supra
note 47, at 8-9. See also infra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the FRB’s reported waiver of
Section 23A during September 2001).
66

In May 2001, the FRB issued proposed and final rules under Sections 23A and 23B that reveal the
scope and complexity of legal and operational issues arising under those statutes. The FRB’s proposed
rule, which would incorporate most of the interpretations that the FRB has previously issued under those
statutes, covers more than 30 pages in the Federal Register. See FRB Proposed Affiliate Transaction Rule,
supra note 65. The FRB’s final rules, which contain new interpretations of the two statutes, occupy more
than a dozen additional pages. See 64 Fed. Reg. 24,220-33 (2001).
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affiliates.67 Given the banking agencies’ current adherence to the concept of consolidated
supervision, I now wonder whether regulators and lobbyists for the financial services industry
actually believed in the virtues of corporate separation during the 1990's, or whether they simply
used the “firewall” argument to help persuade Congress to enact the GLB Act.68
B.

Shortcomings in Capital Regulation

Federal regulators first adopted across-the-board capital rules for banks in 1981-83.
Those rules imposed fixed leverage requirements based on balance sheet assets but did not
account for off-balance-sheet obligations (e.g., standby letters of credit, loan commitments and
derivatives) held by banks. As a result, many banks reduced their effective regulatory capital
requirements by shifting from traditional lending to the issuance of off-balance-sheet commitments
that often carried equal or greater credit risks. 69
During 1989-92, federal regulators implemented the international risk-based capital accord

See, e.g., DeFerrari & Palmer, supra note 55, at 51-53; GAO LCBO Study, supra note 55, at 5,
7, 14-18, 24-30; Meyer FFIEC Speech, supra note 59, at 5-8.
67

See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 44, supra note 21, at 7 (concluding that the holding company structure
would ensure that the FDIC’s deposit insurance funds were “adequately insulated from paying the losses of
firms which are affiliated with insured banks”); H.R. Rep. No. 74, supra note 57, at 99-102 (citing
statements by federal regula tors and industry representatives claiming that corporate separation and
regulatory “firewalls” would insulate FDIC-insured banks from the potential risks of their nonbank
affiliates). See also Flannery, Financial Regulation, supra note 38, at 112 n.10 (stating that “many
proponents of broad financial conglomerate powers insist that legal separateness will effectively insulate
banking activities, without explicitly addressing the question of de facto integration. This omission is
particularly noteworthy when it is accompanied by an assertion that regulation should permit
conglomerates to take maximum advantage of scope economies among the various product lines – which
seems to contradict the promise of de facto separateness!”).
68

Between 1984 and 1989, the off-balance-sheet activities of banks increased from 55% of
on-balance-sheet assets to 164% of such assets. This rapid growth of off-balance-sheet commitments
“effectively decreased capital” at many banks. U.S. Gen. Accounting Off., Deposit Insurance: A Strategy
for Reform, GAO/GGD-91-26, Mar. 1991 [hereinafter GAO Deposit Insurance Reform Study], at 84-85.
See also Berger, Herring & Szegö, supra note 43, at 419-20.
69
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promulgated by the Basel Committee in 1988 (the “1988 Accord”). The 1988 Accord establishes
minimum capital requirements for banks by assigning various types of loans and off-balance-sheet
commitments to four risk-weighted categories based on perceived credit risks. The 1988 Accord
has thus removed the prior regulatory incentive for off-balance-sheet commitments, but its four
risk-weighted categories are too broad and imprecise to distinguish among similar types of assets
with very different degrees of credit risk. For example, a loan to a “blue chip” co rporation with a
triple-A credit rating carries the same 100% risk weight under the 1988 Accord as a loan to a
speculative company with a below-investment grade rating.70 The 1988 Accord’s unsophisticated
treatment of credit risk has enabled LCBOs to engage in “capital arbitrage” by (i) using complex
derivatives, whose embedded risks are difficult to value, as substitutes for conventional financing
arrangements, and (ii) structuring securitizations that transfer low-risk assets out of the bank
while retaining more risky assets (including residual interests in securitizations).71
The 1988 Basel Accord also did not take account of the market risk of derivatives,
securities and other trading assets held by banks. In response to rapid increases in trading activity
at large banks during the early 1990's, the Basel Committee adopted supplemental capital rules for
See Berger, Herring & Szegö, supra note 43, at 414-15; GAO Deposit Insurance Reform Study,
supra note 69, at 85-88.
70

See Robert C. Merton, Financial innovation and the management and regulation of financial
institutions, 19 J. Banking & Fin. 461, 468-70 (1995) (showing how a bank could greatly reduce its
effective capital requirements under the 1988 Accord by using derivatives in place of conventional financial
instruments); Wilmarth, Tr ansformation, supra note 12, Part I(E)(2)(e)(iv) (explaining how large ba nks
have used securitization techniques to engage in “capital arbitrage” that significantly reduces their capital
requirements under the 1988 Accord). See also U.S. Gen. Accounting Off., Risk-Based Capital:
Regula tory and Industry Approaches to Capital and Risk, GAO/GGD-98-153, July 1998 [her einafter cited
as GAO Risk-Based Capital Study], at 68, 169 (reporting that, in discussions with representatives of six
major banks, “[o]fficials of two banks commented that they are not constrained by regulatory capital
requirements, because assets can always be securitized so capital will not have to be held against them, or
they can move to riskier assets in each credit risk category to obtain higher returns”).
71

40

market risk in early 1996, and those rules were promptly implemented by federal bank regulators.
The capital rules for market risk require large banks with significant trading assets to establish
their capital requirements based on internal risk models that measure their “value at risk,” or
VAR, subject to periodic reviews by federal regulators. 72 The Basel Committee’s 2001 proposal
would extend this supervisory trend toward reliance on internal risk management by allowing
qualifying banks to use internal risk ratings for loans in calculating their capital requirements for
credit risk and operational risk.73
As the foregoing summary indicates, federal regulators have repeatedly adjusted their
capital rules over the past two decade in an effort to discourage banks from taking excessive risks.
However, capital rules have not proven to be a sufficient safeguard. Past banking crises have
shown that capital is a “lagging indicator” of bank problems, because declines in capital are
frequently not reported until banks have already become seriously troubled.74 One reason for this
time lag is that many assets held by banks (e.g., commercial loans, OTC derivatives and residual
interests in securitizations) are not traded on any organized market and are therefore very difficult
for regulators and out side investors to value. Accordingly, outsiders frequently do not identify
See GAO Risk-Based Capital Study, supra note 71, at 49-53; Joao A.C. Santos, Bank Capital
Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of the Literature, Bank for Int’l Settlements
Working Paper No. 90, Sept. 2000 (<available at www.bis.org>), at 18, 21.
72

See 2001 Basel Capital Proposal Overview, supra note 61, at 7-10, 17-29; D. Johannes Jüttner,
Message to Ba sle: Risk Reduction Rather T han Management, in NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE , supra
note 28, at 207, 208-09, 217-18.
73

See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Das Kapital: Solvency Regulation of the American Business
Enterprise, in ERIC A. POSNER , ED ., CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Foundation Press,
2000), at 65 [hereinafter cited as Miller, Solvency Regulation], at 78; Joe Peek & Er ic S. Rosengren, The
Use of Capital Ratios to Trigger Intervention in Problem Banks: Too Little, Too Late, New Eng. Econ.
Rev., Sept./Oct. 1996, at 49 [hereinafter cited as Peek & Rosengren, Capital Ratios], at 50-52, 56-57;
GAO Deposit Insurance Reform Study, supra note 69, at 61.
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problems of asset depreciation and reductions in capital until significant damage has already
occurred. Moreover, managers of a troubled bank are inclined to postpone any writedowns of
assets and capital in the hope that they can improve the bank’s situation before its next
supervisory examination or required public disclosure to investors.75
FDICIA’s PCA regime was designed to strengthen the effectiveness of capital regulation
and t o discourage superviso ry forbearance. FDICIA requires bank regulators to schedule yearly
examinations for most banks (including all large banks), and it also compels regulators to take a
series of progressively more stringent enforcement measures if a bank falls below the “adequately
capitalized” standard or below two lower capital thresholds. 76 However, federal regulators
weakened the effectiveness of PCA by choosing a lenient capital adequacy test. Virtually all
banks met this “adequately capitalized” standard when the PCA rules took effect in 1992, even
though the banking industry was just emerging from a major crisis.77 It appears that federal
regulators deliberately chose a low capital threshold for PCA because many large banks could not
have met a higher standard during the early 1990's.78 Studies have confirmed that PCA’s

See, e.g., Berger, Herring & Szegö, supra note 43, at 411-16, 425; Jeffrey W. Gunther &
Robert R. Moore, Financial Statements and Reality: Do Troubled Banks Tell All?, Econ. & Fin. Rev., Fed.
Res. Bank of Dallas, TX, 3d Qtr. 2000, at 30; Peek & Rosengren, Capital Ratios, supra note 74, at 51, 57;
GAO PCA Study, supra note 58, at 43-44.
75

76

See Benston & Kaufman, supra note 58, at 144-48; GAO PCA Study, supra note 58, at 14-21.

See GAO PCA Study, supra note 58, at 26-28 & tbls. 2.1 & 2.2 (stating that (i) banks are
deemed “adequately capitalized” under the PCA rules if they have (A) Tier 1 capital equal to 4% of riskbased assets and 4% of total assets, and (B) total capital equal to 8% of risk-based assets; and (ii) more
than 98% of all ba nks and thrifts satisfied this “adequately capitalized” standard at the end of 1992). See
also Benston & Kaufman, supra note 58, at 146-48 (contending that federal regulators set the “adequately
capitalized” threshold too low); Peek & Rosengren, Capital Ratios, supra note 74, at 57 (same).
77

See GAO Deposit Insurance Reform Study, supra note 69, at 85-87, 91 (sta ting that, as of
September 1990, (i) 96% of all banks met the 8% total risk-based capital requirement for “adequately
78
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“adequately capitalized” threshold would not have identified most troubled banks during the
1980's, and that the standard was also too low to capture most problem banks during the mid1990's.79
In short, the capital adequacy test that triggers supervisory intervention under PCA is “an
unreliable indicator of insolvency risk.”80 The regulators’ selection of a low capital “tripwire” for
PCA creates serious doubts about whether they would return to a policy of supervisory
forbearance if they were confronted with a systemic crisis involving the potential failure of several
large banks. The recent failure of Superior Bank raises additional questions about the
effectiveness of PCA, because regulat ors failed t o recognize or respond to the severity of the
bank’s problems until its capital was already deeply impaired by losses resulting from its high-risk
subprime lending and securitization activities.81
capitalized” status under the 1988 Accord, but (ii) 56% of all banks larger than $1 billion would have
failed to meet the total risk-based capital standard if it were raised to 10%). The GAO was not satisfied
with the 1988 Accord’s capital standards, finding that they were “too low to adequately compensate for the
types of risks that exist in today’s highly competitive banking environment.” Id. at 87.
See David S. Jones & Kathleen K. King, The implementation of prompt corrective action: An
assessment, 19 J. Banking & Fin. 491, 493, 498-99, 508 (1995) (finding that, due to the lenient capital
adequacy test established by regulators, PCA rules would not have applied to the “vast majority” of
troubled banks even if those rules had been in force during the 1980's); Peek & Rosengren, Capital Ratios,
supra note 74, at 52-56 (reaching the same conclusion). See also GAO PCA Study, supra note 58, at 45 &
tbl. 3.1 (finding that, during 1992-95, more than four-fifths of problem banks met the “adequately
capitalized” test and therefore were not subject to mandatory enforcement measures under the PCA rules).
79

80

74, at 57.

Jones & King, supra note 79, at 495. Accord, Peek & Rosengren, Capital Ratios, supra note

See Benston & Kaufman, supra note 58, at 146-49, 152-56; GAO PCA Study, supra note 58, at
5-7, 25-29, 41-49, 55-56; Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys. & U.S. Treas. Dept., The Feasibility and
Desirability of Mandatory Subordinated Debt, Dec. 2000 [hereinafter cited as Federal Subordinated Debt
Study], at ix.
81

Superior Bank, a federally-chartered thrift with assets of $2.3 billion, failed in July 2001 after the
bank’s capital had been wiped out by a decline of more than $500 million in the value of the bank’s
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Anot her continuing problem with capital regulation is the ability of LCBOs to engage in
“capital arbitrage.” As discussed above, large sophisticated banks have repeatedly reduced their
effective capital requirements by exploiting gaps in regulatory capital rules. Big banks shifted to
off-balance-sheet commitments to evade the simple leverage requirements of the 1980's, and they
implemented large-scale securitization programs to exploit the risk-based rules established under
the 1988 Accord.82 Two recent studies have confirmed that higher regulatory capital
requirements failed to eliminate high-risk bank strategies during the early 1990's, especially
among larger banks.83 Thus, the experience of the past two decades indicates that capital
regulation “is inevitably imperfect in its application and encourages all sorts of regulatory
avoidance measures.”84
residual interests resulting from its securitization of $4 billion of subprime loans. As the FDIC
acknowledged, Superior’s failure “illustrates the limits of [PCA] tools given to regulators,” because PCA
sanctions are ineffective when regulators fail to recognize losses embedded in unmarketa ble assets, like
securitization residuals, whose worth depends on “complex, assumption-driven” valuation models.
Statement of FDIC Director John Reich on the Failure of Superior Bank, FSB, submitted to the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Sept. 11, 2001 (available at
<www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/chairman/sp11sep01.html>), at 1. See also Rob Bla ckwell, Failure of
Superior Turns Quickly Into Blame Ga me, Am. Banker, July 31, 2001, at 1; Rob Blackwell, Does
Superior Prove S&L Reforms a Flop?, Am. Banker, Aug. 20, 2001, at 1.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing widespread instances of capital arbitrage
by major banks).
82

See Tina M. Galloway, Winson B. Lee & Dianne M. Roden, Banks’ changing incentives and
opportunities for risk taking, 21 J. Banking & Fin. 509, 513-15, 521-23 (1997) (finding that, during 199094, stricter federal regulations “did not appear to have a significant impact on risk-taking behavior” by
banks that had low charter values and “high risk-taking incentives”); Armen Hovakimian & Edward J.
Kane, Effectiveness of Capital Regulation at U.S. Commercial Banks, 1985 to 1994, 55 J. Fin. 451, 452,
461-64 (2000) (finding that (i) during 1992-94, stricter federal rules “cur tailed but did not eliminate riskshifting incentives” by weak banks that sought to “extract a deposit insurance subsidy,” id. at 464, and (ii)
“the effectiveness of regulatory discipline declines as banks grow larger,” id. at 461).
83

Miller, Solvency Regulation, supra note 74, at 78. See also 2000 Meyer FFIEC Speech, supra
note 59, at 2-3 (stating that (i) bankers “will arbitrage” whenever they believe that regulatory capital
requirements exceed their own view of needed economic capital “by more than the cost of arbitrage,” and
84
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The Basel Committee and federal bank regulators are attempting to grapple with these
shortcomings in capital regulation for LCBOs by shifting from uniform rules to an individualized
approach that relies on internal risk management policies developed by each LCBO. However,
this effort to base capital requirements on LCBOs’ internal risk ratings is a highly problematic
move. Bank credit scoring models failed to anticipate the surge in consumer defaults on credit
card loans that occurred during 1996-97. Similarly, “Value-at-Risk” (“VAR”) models developed
by J.P. Morgan and other leading banks did not predict the severe trading losses that occurred
during the global financial market disruption triggered by Russia’s debt default in 1998.85 Studies
have shown that the most widely-used bank models for estimating market risk and credit risk are
unreliable, because (i) they are based on faulty assumptions and insufficient data, and (ii) they
permit banks to pursue strategies that may prove to be disastrous, because they tolerate a lowpercentage risk of catastro phic losses.86 Anot her glaring problem is that conventional risk models

(ii) “regardless of [regulatory] actions, frontier banks will always attempt to manage their businesses to
earn competitive risk-adjusted rates of return on equity”) (emphasis in original).
See Jeremy Berkowitz & James O’Brien, How Accurate Are Value-at-Risk Models at
Commercial Banks?, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Ser., Working Paper
2001-31, July 2001 (available at <www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2001>), at 3-5 (finding that VAR
models for trading activities at six major U.S. ba nks failed to anticipate large trading losses during the
1998 disruption in world financial markets, as the models’ predictions of maximum possible losses were
“blown out” by the losses actually incurred); Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts
I(E)(2)(b)(iii)(C), I(E)(2)(c) & I(E)(2)(e)(iii)(B) (discussing shortcomings in VAR and credit scoring
models developed by J.P. Morgan and other large banks).
85

For analysis of the questionable methodologies underlying the market risk and credit risk models
used by major banks, see Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Pa rt I(E)(2)(b)(iii)(C) (discussing
major flaws in bank models for market risk); Patricia Jackson & William Perraudin, Regulatory
implications of credit risk modelling, 24 J. Banking & Fin. 1 (2000) (discussing various problems with
bank models for credit risk and concluding that “capital requirements based directly on credit risk models
are simply not a practical possibility in the near future”); Robert A. Jarrow & Stuart M. Turnbull, The
intersection of market and credit risk, 24 J. Banking & Fin. 271, 272-78 (2000) (discussing serious
problems with the “standard methodologies for credit risk management” used at most banks, id. at 273);
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evaluate market risk and credit risk in isolation from each other, contrary to abundant evidence
showing that “market and credit risk are intrinsically related to each other and . . . are not
separable.”87
The Basel Committee’s 2001 proposal “stop[s] sho rt” of allowing banks to establish their
capital requirements based on “full [internal] credit risk models.” Nevertheless, the proposal
would allow each qualifying bank to use internal risk ratings in estimating the probability of
default by borrowers and the banks’ exposure to loss in the event of default.88 Analysts have
questioned, however, whether most large banks have reliable internal risk management systems to
calculate even these more limited measures of credit risk and their potential correlations across

Jüttner, supra note 71, at 208-19 (same); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets? Two
Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 Wash. U. L. Q. 619, 660-61 (1999) (stating that “even
the most sophisticated current methods of analyzing credit risk are seriously flawed”).
Other studies conclude that VAR models used by regulat ors to determine capital requirements for
market risk create a perverse incentive for banks. These VAR-based capital rules penalize banks that
exceed a defined risk threshold on more than 1% of trading days during a 250-day trading period.
However, the VAR rules do not assess any additiona l penalties based on the magnitude of losses that a
bank may incur during those “outlier” days. Because the VAR rules focus on the frequency rather than the
magnitude of tra ding losses, the rules encourage profit-maximizing banks to construct risky asset portfolios
that may produce larger gains but also tolerate a low-percentage risk of catastrophic losses. See Gordon J.
Alexander & Alexandre M. Baptista , A VaR-Constrained Mean-Varia nce Model: Implications for
Portfolio Selection and the Basle Capital Accord, Working Paper, July 16, 2001, passim (available at
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=275894>); Suleyman Basak & Alexander Shapiro,
Value-at-Risk-Based Management: Optimal Policies and Asset Prices, 14 Rev. Fin. Stud. 371, 372-80,
385, 398-99 (2001).
See Jarrow & Turnbull, supra note 86, at 272 (quote), 273-77, 292-93; Jüttner, supra note 73,
at 218-19, 223-25.
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See 2001 Basel Capital Proposal Overview, supra note 61, at 8 (quote), 17-23; Speech by FRB
Governor Laurence H. Meyer before the Institute of Int’l Bankers, May 5, 2001 (<available at
www.federalreserve.gov>) [hereinafter cited as Meyer IIB Speech], at 4-5, 7-8.
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entire loan portfolios.89
A more fundamental problem is that bank regulators and bankers have sharply conflicting
motivations in establishing capital standards. Regulators and bankers have a shared int erest in
choosing a capital level that will allow banks to earn profits and avoid a clear risk of insolvency.
Beyond this common interest, however, the goals of regulators and bankers diverge significantly.
Regulators want conservative capital rules that discourage imprudent risk-taking and protect the
federal safety net, even at the expense of constraining bank profits. In cont rast, bankers want
liberal capital rules that permit higher leverage and a greater ability to exploit the federal safety
net subsidy, because those circumstances create the potential for higher shareholder returns.
Accordingly, it is very doubtful whether federal regulators can rely on bankers to incorporate
supervisory concerns in their internal risk management process.90 Bankers would clearly have a
strong incentive to manipulate their internal risk rating systems to reduce their effective capital
requirements.91
In this regard, it is very troubling that the Basel Committee’s 2001 proposal offers LCBOs
the opportunity to reduce their capital requirements if they establish internal rating systems for
See Howell E. Jackson, The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Establishment of Capital
Standards for Financial Institutions in a Global Economy (undated working paper on file with the author)
[hereinafter cited as Jackson, Role of Credit Rating Agencies], at 9-15; Jüttner, supra note 73, at 208-22;
John J. Mingo, Policy implications of the Federal Reserve study of credit risk models at major US banking
institutions, 24 J. Banking & Fin. 15, 25-29 (2000).
89
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71, at 94.

See GAO LCBO Study, supra note 55, at 41-42; GAO Risk-Based Capital Study, supra note

See GAO Risk-Based Capital Study, supra note 71, at 96-98. See also Jackson, Role of Credit
Rating Agencies, supra note 89, at 15 (questioning “how much regulatory authorities should delegate the
establishment of capital standards to bank management,” since “the reason why we regulate bank capital
requirements in the first place is the belief that left to their own devices banks will maintain less capital
than is socially desirable”).
91
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credit risk. The proposal essentially guarantees that banks with qualified internal rating systems
will receive lower capital requirements than banks who se capital levels are determined under t he
Committee’s “standardised approach” for credit risk. The Basel Committee thus appears to be
inviting LCBOs to develop internal rating systems for the specific purpose of reducing their
capital.92 This approach hardly seems consistent with recent evidence indicating that major banks
do not hold sufficient capital and reserves in light of their inherent risks.93
A further problem with the Basel proposal is that regulators may not possess sufficient
expertise to understand and critique the internal risk management systems developed by LCBOs.
Regulators generally cannot compete with major financial institutions in hiring highly-paid
financial “rocket scientists” to design and analyze complex derivatives and other sophisticated risk
management tools. Accordingly, regulators may not be able to verify, with a high degree of
confidence, the internal risk models and ratings developed by financial conglomerates.94
Finally, the new supervisory strategy of basing capital requirements on internal risk
management raises the issue of how to deter LCBOs from deliberately or negligently reducing
their capital below a level that is reasonably needed to ensure their solvency. A few years ago, the
See 2001 Basel Capital Proposal Overview, supra note 61, at 9 (stating that, as an incentive for
banks to develop internal ratings-based approaches, the proposal provides “capital incentives [for the
internal ratings-based approach] relative to the standardised approach”); June 2001 Basel Update, supra
note 61 (confirming that the proposed new capital accord would give “capital incentives . . . to encourage
banks to adopt these more advanced approaches to credit risk”). See also Meyer IIB Speech, supra note
88, at 5, 7-8, 10 (stating that banks qualifying for the inter nal ratings-based approach would have “lower
total regulatory capital charges” and could experience “a significant decline in capital requirements relative
to current levels”).
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See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(C) (discussing analysts’ and regulators’
concerns about insufficient bank capital and reserves).
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See KAUFMAN , ON MONEY AND MARKETS, supr a note 34, at 225-29; GAO LCBO Study,
supra note 55, at 7, 48; GAO Risk-Based Capital Study, supra note 71, at 98-99.
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FRB considered a “precommitment” approach, under which LCBOs would commit to maintain
adequate capital based on their int ernal risk management systems and would pay fines if their
capital allocations proved t o be inadequate to meet their actual risks. However, this
“precommitment” approach was not adopted, and analysts have questioned whether regulators
would actually be willing to impose penalties that were large enough to deter LCBOs from
manipulating their internal risk calculations. As critics noted, major banks are most likely to
suffer capital shortfalls during periods of severe economic strain, and regulators would
understandably be reluctant under those conditions to enforce large fines that might threaten the
solvency of troubled LCBOs.95 Unfortunately, the Basel Committee’s 2001 proposal does not
suggest any reliable mechanism for discouraging LCBOs from using aggressive methods of
internal risk measurement as a new form of capital arbitrage.96
C.

Current Limitations on Supervisory and Market Discipline

Bank supervision and market discipline share a common goal of discouraging banks from
taking excessive risks. Recent studies have shown that examinations by regulators and market
discipline by investors, analysts and credit rating agencies play complementary roles in restraining
See Jackson & Perraudin, supra note 86, at 11-12; GAO Risk-Based Capital Study, supra note
71, at 110-11. In 1996, the New York Clearing House conducted a one-year test in which 10 major banks
each precommitted an amount of capital for market risk based on its internal risk models. None of the 10
banks incurred trading losses that exceeded its precommitted capital during the one-year test period. It
should be noted, however, that (i) the precommitted capital amounts were less than the levels that would
have been required under the existing capital rules for market risk, and (ii) the test occurred during a period
of relative calm in the financial markets. While this test was too short to provide a reliable evaluation of
the precommitment appr oach, it did suggest that LCBOs are likely to reduce their capital levels if they are
permitted to rely on internal risk models. See id. at 112-13.
95

Cf. Mingo, supra note 89, at 17-18 (warning that “the pace of financial innovation is such that
simply recognizing the act of [regulatory capital arbitrage (“RCA”)] is often quite difficult. . . . The sheer
complexity and diversity of RCA, coupled with the limited budgets of supervisory agencies, make rapid
discovery of RCA impractical, if not impossible”).
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risk-taking by banks. It appears that differing oversight methods used by regulators and market
observers enable each group to discover proprietary information about banks that is not readily
available to the other group. 97
Nevertheless, both bank regulators and the securities markets have often failed to identify
problems at major financial institutions until those institutions were already seriously or fatally
injured. For example, federal regulators, credit rating agencies and investors did not recognize
severe weaknesses at many large banks during the 1980's (including Continental Illinois and Bank
of New England) until those banks were dangerously close to failure.98 Federal regulators also
failed in 1998 to perceive the grave threat that Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”) posed
to leading banks and securities firms, as well as the financial markets generally, until the hedge
fund revealed its perilous condition to the FRB-NY.99 Credit rating agencies did not anticipate the
failure of several large insurance companies in the early 1990's, or the Orange County bankruptcy

See, e.g., Allen N. Berger, Sally M. Da vies & Mark J. Flannery, Comparing Market and
Supervisory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who Knows What When?, 32 J. Money, Credit &
Banking 641 (2000); Robert DeYoung et al., T he Information Content of Bank Exam Ratings and
Subordinated Debt Prices, 33 J. Money, Credit & Banking 900 (2001); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res.
Sys., Staff Study 172, Using Subordinated Debt as an Instrument of Market Discipline, Dec. 1999
[hereinafter cited as FRB Staff Subordinated Debt Study], at 5, 12-15 (reviewing studies evaluating the
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in late 1994, or the defaults of several subprime consumer finance companies in 1997.100 Most
securities analysts expressed surprise when First Union and Wells Fargo publicly disclosed the
disastrous results of their mergers with CoreStates and First Interstate, respectively. 101
In the international arena, the IMF, bank regulators, credit rating agencies and investors all
failed to anticipate the onset, severity and contagious effects of the Mexican peso crisis of 199495 and the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-98.102 Similarly, regulators, banks and investors did
not comprehend the potential risk exposures of major U.S. banks to tho se foreign crises. The
former co-chairman of Citigroup recently ackno wledged that major banks, in spite of their costly
investments in risk management, failed to foresee major shocks to the global financial system
during the 1990's, and he candidly acknowledged that “we don’t do very well in managing risk in
the financial sector.”103
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See Partnoy, supra note 86, at 661-62, 665.
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Three primary factors appear to explain these repeated failures in supervisory and market
discipline of LCBOs. First, major banks have become more complex and harder to evaluate by
regulat ors and the financial markets over t he past three decades. Second, all of the three leading
external sources of discipline for large banks – securities analysts, rating agencies and bank
regulators – are compromised to a substantial degree by conflicting interests and goals. Third,
while market discipline is frequently ineffective in predicting the onset of financial crises, it can be
indiscriminate in punishing firms after a financial crisis begins. As a consequence, regulators
have consistently opposed any strong form of market discipline, based on their fear that investors
will engage in mass “flights to safety” during economic crises and thereby undermine the stability
of financial markets.
1.

The Growing Complexity and Opacity of Financial Conglomerates

Big banks have increasingly specialized over the past three decades in providing loans to
borrowers whose financial condition and future prospects cannot be readily assessed by the
securities markets. Improvements in information technology and financial innovations have
enabled the securities markets to underwrite debt securities for a broader range of issuers, thereby
forcing large banks to shift their commercial lending focus to more risky and opaque firms. As a
result, regulators and financial markets find it increasingly difficult to comprehend the risks
embedded in bank loan portfolios.104

Res. 47, 57-59 (1999) (finding that the Mexican peso crisis was “surprising to traders” and caused
significant volatility in the stock prices for big banks that had major lending exposures to Mexico); infra
notes 107-08 and accompanying text (discussing studies finding that investors failed to anticipate serious
problems at large U.S. banks during 1975-94).
See supra note 14 and accompanying text; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts
I(A) & I(E)(2)(a)(iii) & (d).
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Major banks have also increased their opacity to regulators and the securities markets by
expanding their dealing and trading activities involving securities and OTC derivatives. Like bank
loans, OTC derivatives are privately-negotiated, customized financial instruments whose terms
and potential financial impact are largely unknown to outsiders.105 OTC derivatives and complex,
option-based securities enable banks (i) to place highly-leveraged bets on the direction of interest
rates, currency rates and market prices for commodities, bonds and stocks, and (ii) to make rapid
and fundamental changes in their risk exposures. As a result of this new financial technology, it is
extremely hard for regulators and market participants to evaluate the current financial condition of
major banks. At the same time, financial conglomerates are creating new correlations among
interest rate risk, credit risk and market risk as they combine traditional lending operations with
investment banking and insurance activities. Neither regulators nor market participants are well
positioned to assess the potential dangers of these new risk correlations.106
Three recent studies demonstrate the relative opacity of major banks to the financial
markets. One study found that investors did not anticipate either dividend cuts or regulatory
enforcement actions at seventeen big “money center” banks during 1975-92. Public
announcements of both types of events caused sharp, immediate declines in the stock prices of the
See id., Parts I(A)(1), I(E)(1) & I(E)(2)(b) (discussing “opaque” nature of bank loans and OTC
financial derivatives). See also Partnoy, supra note 86, at 676-81 (describing credit derivatives as “among
the most exotic, fastest growing, and perhaps most problematic segment of the derivatives market,” id. at
676, and explaining that “a risk buyer [under a credit swap] can increase its exposure [to credit risk]
without increasing the size of its balance sheet,” id. at 677).
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subject banks. In addition, public disclosures of dividend cuts had significantly negative
contagious effects on the stock prices of other “money center” and regional banks.107 A second
study concluded that public reports of Bankers Trust’s legal problems in 1994 with disgruntled
OTC derivatives clients had a significantly adverse impact on Bankers Trust’s sto ck price as well
as the stock prices of thirteen other banks that were leading dealers in OTC derivatives.108 Both
studies indicate that the financial markets did not comprehend the potential risk exposures of
major banks until their problems were publicly disclosed.
Finally, a third study determined that, during 1983-93, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s
had greater disagreements in their bond ratings for banks and insurance companies than for any
other type of firm. In addition, the rating agencies’ disagreements over bond ratings for banks
increased after 1986, notwithstanding the efforts of Congress and bank regulators to restrict the
scope of the TBTF policy. Donald Morgan, the study’s author, concluded that the largest banks
became less transparent to credit rating agencies after 1986 as those banks increased their focus
on trading in securities, OTC derivatives and other financial instruments. The rating agencies
apparently found it difficult to assess the risks inherent in bank trading positions that changed
rapidly and without timely notice to market participants. The high concentrations of loans held
by big banks also increased their opacity, because the rating agencies could not readily measure

See Myron B. Slovin, Marie E. Slushka & John A. Polonchek, An anlysis of contagion and
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the creditworthiness of the borrowers.109
2.

Conflicting Interests and Objectives among Outside Monitors

The effectiveness of the principal outside monitors for LCBOs – financial analysts, credit
rating agencies and regulators – is undermined to a substantial degree by their conflicting
incentives and goals. Financial analysts have become more lenient in their assessment of large
banks in recent years, due to the employment of most leading analysts by major securities firms.
Wall Street firms obviously want to sell investment banking services to major banks, and
investment bankers within those firms have therefore brought intense pressure on their analyst
colleagues to issue favorable investment reports for leading banks. Indeed, securities firms have
dismissed several prominent analysts who expressed bearish or critical opinions about big banks.110

Similarly, the independence and reliability of credit ratings have declined as rating

See Donald P. Morgan, Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry, Fed. Res.
Bank of N.Y., Staff Reports No. 105, May 2000 (available at <www.ny.frb.org>). See also Morgan &
Stiroh, supra note 36, at 504-06.
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reportedly being dismissed by Credit Suisse for bearish calls on major ba nks, joined Prudentia l Securities
and felt free to issue “sell” recommendations for nine banks, because Prudential had closed down its
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agencies have gained the power to issue “regulatory licenses” to bo nd issuers. Rules adopt ed by
federal and state regulators since 1975 have greatly restricted the ability of banks, mutual funds
and insurance companies to purchase debt securities that do not carry investment-grade ratings
from nationally-recognized rating agencies. Issuers are willing to pay substantial fees to the
designated rating agencies to earn high ratings, because those ratings serve as de facto regulatory
licenses and permit the sale of bonds to institutional investors. 111
Professor Frank Partnoy contends that these regulations “have fundament ally changed the
nature of the product rating agencies sell. Today, issuers are paying rating fees, not to purchase
credibility with the investor community, but rather to purchase a license [t o sell bonds] from the
regulators.” As a result, rating agencies focus primarily on the opportunity to earn lucrative fees
from bond issuers, instead of making costly investments to protect their reputation for accurate
ratings. Rating agencies have concluded that they can “maintain whatever credibility they need by
parroting market price moves,” since it is “easy to follow market events and adjust ratings after
the fact.”112
The unfortunate results o f these changed incentives for rating agencies are that (i) bond
ratings have become “lagging indicators of credit quality,” and (ii) the rating agencies have

See Partnoy, supra note 86, at 623-24, 681-83, 688-703. See also Lawrence J. White, The
Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Orga nization Analysis, N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law & Bus. Working Paper
No. 01-001, April 20, 2001 (available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=267083>), at 5,
10-14, 23-24.
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Partnoy, supra note 86, at 703. See also id. at 651-54, 681-82 (contending that, by virtue of
their ability to sell “regulatory licenses,” the nationally-recognized rating agencies operate under
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become subject to increased pressure to provide high ratings to powerful issuers.113 Given these
developments, some analysts have criticized proposals (including the new Basel capital adequacy
proposal) that would rely on credit ratings of borrowers in determining capital requirements for
banks under the “standardised appro ach” for calculating credit risk. These analysts fear that using
credit ratings as a supervisory tool could intensify the pressures on rating agencies – from
borrowers, banks and even regulators – to provide favorable ratings for important borrowers,
especially during times of financial stress.114
Bank regulators also have conflicting goals that often lead them to adopt a policy of
supervisory forbearance toward LCBOs. Despite their policy interest in preventing moral hazard,
regulators have a personal reputational interest in postponing the recognition of big bank failures
so that a major, well-publicized disaster will not occur “on their watch.” In addition, during
financial crises, regulators are strongly influenced by their fear that a major bank failure could
trigger a systemic panic within the financial system.115 This regulatory dilemma was vividly
illustrated during the banking crisis of 1980-92, when regulators consistently chose to rescue (or
at least postpone the failure) of big banks. In structuring bailouts of First Pennsylvania and
Continental Illinois, in postponing the failures of First RepublicBank and Bank of New England,
and in providing extensive forbearance to Bank of America and Citicorp, regulators repeatedly
demonstrated their preference for maintaining financial stability. There is little doubt that the
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regulat ors’ accommodating treatment of TBTF institut ions increased moral hazard and risk-taking
among large banks.116
The emergence of bank-centered financial conglomerates during the 1990's, and the GLB
Act’s explicit blessing for those conglomerates, will almost certainly intensify the TBTF problems
that afflicted bank regulators during the 1980-92 crisis. Most analysts assume that regulators will
not allow a big universal bank or any of its significant subsidiaries to fail. This assumption finds
support in the FRB’s aggressive actions to stabilize the financial markets following the Russian
debt crisis of 1998, when the FRB (i) organized the rescue of LTCM to prevent a failure that
could have created serious “spillover” effects for several major financial institutions, (ii) arranged
the sale of a deeply-troubled Bankers Trust to Deutsche Bank, and (iii) orchestrated three rapid
cuts in short-term interest rates to restore liquidity and confidence in the financial markets. The
FRB’s 1998 actions – particularly when viewed against the background of its similar stabilizing
actions during the 1970 Penn Central crisis, the 1980 Hunt silver crisis and the 1987 stock market
crash – have created stro ng expectations that federal regulat ors will intervene to prevent the
failure not only of big banks but also of major nonbanking firms whose default could threaten the
solvency of large banks or the stability of the financial markets.117 Such expectations obviously
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undermine the incentives of creditors to monitor and control risk-taking by large financial
conglomerates.118
3.

Limitations on the Effectiveness of Market Discipline as a Risk
Control Device for Universal Banks
a.

The Inconsistency of Market Discipline

The reliability of market discipline as a risk control device is also limited by the fact that
financial markets often appear to be ineffective in predicting the onset of economic crises and
indiscriminate in punishing risky firms after crises occur. Recent studies have shown that market
discipline fluctuates in its intensity, with more relaxed monitoring in good times and more
stringent oversight during periods of financial stress. The varying intensity of market discipline is
exemplified by the tendency of investors to act with excessive optimism during an expansionary
“bubble” and to panic when the “bubble” bursts. For example, during the mid-1990's, financial
institut ions and other investors from developed nations disregarded potential warning signs and
made huge investments in Latin America, Asia and Russia. However, when subsequent events
revealed the full risks of those investments, foreign investors engaged in frenzied “flights to
safety” that had a devastating impact on developing economies. The crises of the 1990's, like
earlier “boom-and-bust cycles” in domestic and fo reign economies since 1970, show how difficult
it is for market participants and regulators (i) to avoid an excessive expansion o f credit and
speculative activities during the “bubble” phase of an economic boom, and (ii) to prevent a

See, e.g, Flannery, Financial Regulation, supra note 38, at 102, 107-08; KAUFMAN , ON
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liquidity crisis in the financial markets and a sharp contraction in credit after the “bubble” bursts.119

The information technology and telecommunications sectors experienced a similar “boo mand-bust cycle” in the United States and Europe during 1996-2001. Investors bid up the stocks
of high-technology companies to stratospheric levels during the bull market of the late 1990's.
During the same period, banks, venture capital funds and other institutional investors provided
abundant debt and equity financing to Internet and telecommunications ventures. By the spring of
2000, however, it became evident that (i) the “new economy” would not continue to grow at the
rapid pace of the 1990's, and (ii) Internet and telecommunications firms could not meet their
optimistic forecasts for revenues and earnings, because they had created operating capacity that
far exceeded near-term customer demand for their services. As financial markets recognized the
magnitude of these adverse developments, investors sold off shares of high-tech companies and
the markets for initial public offerings, junk bonds and bank loans virtually shut down for Internet
and telecommunications firms.
Between March 2000 and July 2001, the NASDAQ stock market lost 60% of its value and
high-tech stock markets in Europe fared even worse. Unfortunately, the damage caused by the
bursting of the Internet “bubble” was not confined to high-technology sectors. The Internet
“bust” triggered a generalized slowdown in U.S. and European economies and posed a significant
threat to the health of major financial institutions. By the fall of 2001, some analysts warned that

See, e.g., Allen & Gale, supra note 52, at 236-40, 247-54; Bernanke & Gertler, supra note 45,
at 17-21; Chang & Velasco, supra note 45; Kaufman, Banking Architecture, supra note 28, at 46-47;
Kaufman, Banking Crises, supra note 43, at 11-18; KAUFMAN , ON MONEY AND MARKETS, supra note 34,
at 68-83, 201-25, 270-325; Marshall, supra note 102, at 2-8, 13-15; ROBERT J. SHILLER , IRRAT IONAL
EXUBERANCE 96-132, 203-33 (2000).
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financial institutions with heavy exposures to syndicated loans and junk bonds could face losses
comparable to those suffered by the banking and thrift industries during the 1980's.120
The foregoing evidence indicates that market discipline does not exert a consistent
restraining force on managerial risk-taking. Investors are prone to engage in periodic cycles of
euphoria and panic, due in part to t heir uncertainty about the direction of the economy and the
soundness of financial intermediaries.121 These cycles of investo r sentiment are evident in the
banking industry as well as the general economy. Studies of recent banking crises in the United
States and Latin America have concluded that investors and depositors (i) failed to restrain risktaking by bank managers until a financial crisis revealed that their institutions had already suffered
severe harm, (ii) typically reacted to a crisis in the short term by punishing all banks exposed to
the crisis, with only a limited degree of discrimination among banks with differing risk exposures,
and (iii) applied a more effective and discriminating form of discipline only after the crisis had
passed.122 Benton Gup has summarized the historical record of market discipline as a risk control

For discussion of the events discussed in the two preceding paragraphs, see, e.g., Franklin
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device as follows:
[B]ank regulat ors hope that market discipline will aid them in their task of bank
supervision. This chapter questioned the effectiveness of market discipline. The
track record of market discipline examined here suggests that it usually occurs
after a significant incident, and that it does little to prevent misbehavior. . . . If
market discipline means survival of the fittest, it works. If market discipline means
controlling behavior, it does not appear to be effective.123
Notwithstanding this cautionary evidence regarding the limitations of market discipline,
several prominent analysts have argued that a mandatory subordinated debt program for LCBOs
would effectively control managerial risk-taking and supervisory forbearance. Under this
appro ach, LCBOs would be required to issue subordinated debt on a frequent and continuing
basis in order to satisfy a designated portion of their capital requirements. According to
proponents of market discipline, holders of subordinated debt have strong incentives to control
risk, because (i) subordinated debtholders face a greater risk of loss and (unlike equity holders) do
not receive potential gains when managers pursue speculative strategies, (ii) in contrast to
deposits, subordinated debt issues have relatively long maturities that prevent their holders from
engaging in sudden “runs,” and (iii) based on the FDIC’s record of dealing with large failing banks
since 1984, holders of subordinated debt issued by LCBOs would feel more exposed to loss than
S. Jordan, Insiders’ Assessments of the Stock Market’s Pricing of New England Bank Stocks, 1988 to
1991, New Eng. Econ. Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, MA, July/Aug. 1997, at 3 passim (concluding that
(i) while equity investors punished the stocks of failing banks most severely, they aggressively sold the
stocks of all publicly-traded New England banks during the regional banking crisis of 1989-91, and (ii)
insiders at New England banks that ultimately survived recognized tha t the market had overreacted and
made substantial purchases of their own bank’s stock); Maria S. M. Peria & Sergio L. Schmukler, Do
Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises,
56 J. Fin. 1029, 1030-31, 1048-50 (2001) (finding that, during 1981-97, depositors in Argentina, Chile and
Mexico provided limited discipline before banking crises, engaged in generalized panics (with little
attention to “bank fundamentals”) during crises, and applied effective discipline based on “bank
fundamentals” only after crises had passed).
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holders of uninsured deposits.124
Advocates claim that a mandatory subordinated debt program would discourage LCBOs
from taking excessive risks as long as regulators took appropriate steps based on “yield spreads”
between the interest payable on each LCBO’s subordinated debt and interest rates for either riskfree Treasury bills or low-risk corporate bonds. The weakest form of discipline would occur if
regulators had discretion to use an LCBO’s high yield spreads as a “warning signal” to justify
more stringent supervisory oversight. A more stringent form of discipline would result if high
yield spreads forced regulators to apply sanctions against the LCBO under the PCA regime. The
stro ngest form of discipline would take place if regulators prohibited each LCBO from issuing
subordinated debt with yield spreads that exceeded a specified limit. Under the third appro ach,
LCBOs that could not issue qualifying subordinated debt would be forced to shrink their assets to
remain in compliance with capital rules. Proponents of mandat ory subordinated debt generally
favor the last two approaches because they minimize regulatory discret ion and reduce the
potential for supervisory forbearance.125
The effectiveness of a mandatory subordinated debt program depends, in substantial part,
on whether yield spreads provide an accurate measure of bank-specific risk. Unfortunately,
several studies have questio ned, on at least three grounds, whether yield spreads can accurately
and consistently distinguish between the relative risks posed by banks. First, yield spreads on
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bank subordinated debt have shown the same recurring pattern of relaxation and constraint that
occurs more generally in the financial markets during “boom-and-bust” cycles. For example,
credit markets maintained relatively low differentials between the yields on subordinated debt
issued by low-risk and higher-risk banks during recent periods of relative st ability in the banking
industry (e.g., the mid-1980's and 1992-96). In contrast, during recent periods of significant
stress in the banking industry (e.g., 1988-91 and 1997-98), yield spreads widened considerably
between subordinated debt issued by low-risk and higher-risk banks. Thus, investors exerted
stricter discipline against more risky banks only after their underlying problems had been revealed
by adverse economic conditions.126
A second problem is that yield spreads between bank subordinated debt and either
Treasury bills or low-risk corporate bonds are “noisy” measures of relative bank risk, because
those spreads reflect general economic hazards and industry-wide problems as well as bankspecific risks. A third difficulty is that yield spreads are significantly affected by the age and size
of subordinated debt issues and the size of the issuing bank. Recent studies have shown that
investors apply significant discounts to older or smaller issues of subordinated debt (due to
concerns about liquidity), and also to debt issued by midsized banks that are believed to lack
protection under the TBTF doctrine. Given these complications, many observers have warned
that substantial further empirical work must be done before yield spreads can be used with
confidence in evaluating the comparative risks of banks.127
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See Robert R. Bliss, Market discipline and subordinated debt: A review of some salient issues,
25 Econ. Perspectives No. 1, Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., IL, 1st Qtr. 2001, at 24, 25, 29-37; Diana Hancock
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Perhaps the greatest potential drawback of a mandatory subordinated debt rule is its
tendency to aggravate the impact of banking crises on the broader economy. As indicated above,
proponents of a mandatory program want regulators to respond to high yield spreads with strict
sanctions for troubled LCBOs. Thus, for example, if an LCBO failed to issue subordinated debt
with acceptable yield spreads, regulators would compel the bank to shrink its assets and,
potentially, could appoint a receiver for the bank under the PCA regime. The problem with this
approach is that banks usually find it very difficult to issue risky securities (e.g., equity capital or
subordinated debt) at precisely the time when they need new capital most desperately – viz.,
during a severe economic downturn that produces widespread business failures and causes
significant loan losses for many banks. If troubled banks are ordered to increase their capital
ratios during a serious recession, their most likely response is to cut their lending drastically when
they cannot find investo rs for new issues of stock or subordinated debt. Bank retrenchments in
lending and, in the worst case, bank failures disrupt credit relationships with borrowers, thereby
aggravating the economic downturn that triggered bank capital problems in the first place. For
example, during the early 1990's, a rapid rise in nonperforming bank loans and the imposition of
higher capital requirements forced many banks to curtail their lending sharply, resulting in a
prolonged “credit crunch.”128

& Myron L. Kwast, Using Subordinated Debt to Monitor Bank Holding Companies: Is It Feasible?, J. Fin.
Serv. Res. (2001) (forthcoming); Federal Subordinated Debt Study, supra note 81, at 24-30; FRB Staff
Subordinated Debt Study, supra note 97, at 46-49, 56-58.
See Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Liquidity Provision, Bank Ca pital, and the
Macroeconomy, Working Paper, Oct. 9. 2000 (copy on file with the author); FRB Staff Subordinated Debt
Study, supra note 97, at 35-36, 63-66. For discussions of the impact of higher U.S. bank capital
requirements on the “credit crunch” of the early 1990's, see, e.g., Robert T. Clair & Paula Tucker, Six
Causes of the Credit Crunch, Econ. Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of Dallas, TX, 3d Qtr. 1993, at 1, 5-10; Joe Peek
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Advocates of mandatory subordinated debt recognize that their proposal’s most
troublesome feature is its inherent tendency to amplify business downturns. As a safety valve,
proponents have suggested the concept of limited supervisory waivers during economic crises to
prevent severe disruptions in credit flows. 129 This concession demonstrates that strict market
discipline creates very difficult tradeoffs between the benefits of eliminating moral hazard and the
risks of undermining financial stability. As discussed in the next section, it is likely that regulators
will choose a policy of stabilization and supervisory forbearance whenever a financial crisis
threatens to set off a generalized panic among investors.
b.

Resistance to Market Discipline among Regulators and Major
Banks

Bank regulators fully comprehend the harsh effects of market discipline during financial
crises.130 For that reason, they have shown little enthusiasm for any “strong” form of market
oversight, despite their recent expressions of support for better monitoring by investors.
For example, during the banking crisis of 1989-91 regulators and other policymakers
lamented many of the adverse effects of market discipline (e.g., frequent bank failures, the

& Eric Rosengren, Bank regulation and the credit crunch, 19 J. Banking & Fin. 679 (1995); Ronald E.
Shrieves & Drew Dahl, Regulation, Recession, and Bank Lending Behavior: The 1990 Credit Crunch, 9 J.
Fin. Serv. Res. 5 (1995); Larry D. Wall & David R. Peterson, Bank holding company capital targets in the
early 1990s: The regulators versus the markets, 19 J. Banking & Fin. 563 (1995).
See Calomiris, supra note 125, at 1510-16 (suggesting that the government could purchase
preferred stock to recapitalize banks and maintain a reasonable flow of bank credit during severe economic
crises); Evanoff & Wa ll, supr a note 125, at 47-48, 51 n.29 (suggesting that r egulators could provide
“temporary relief” from subordinated debt rules if corporate bond markets were frozen by a generalized
“liquidity crunch”).
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See, e.g., 1999 Gr eenspan IMF Speech, supra note 48, at 1-3; 2000 Meyer NBER Speech,
supra note 56, at 1-4.
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inability of most banks to raise new capital, and the “credit crunch” that resulted from the inability
of capital-constrained banks to make new loans).131 Regulators also did their best to weaken the
restrictions on supervisory forbearance established by FDICIA’s PCA regime.132 During the mid1990's, regulators joined the banking industry in trying unsuccessfully to block changes in
accounting rules that required banks to adopt market-value accounting principles for assets held in
trading accounts. The new accounting rules were specifically designed to improve market
discipline by making the financial operations of banks more transparent to investors.
Nevertheless, regulators and the banking industry claimed that the new rules would have a
destabilizing effect by creating more “volatility” in the reported earnings of banks.133

See Helen A. Garten, Whatever Happened to Market Discipline of Banks?, 1991 Ann. Survey
of Am. L. 749, 750-54, 776-83.
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See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text; Benston & Kaufman, supra note 58, at 146-49;
GAO PCA Study, supra note 58, at 20-21, 36-40, 49-52 (explaining that federal regulators weakened
safety-and soundness requirements included in the PCA regime by adopting discretionary guidelines instead
of mandatory operating rules).
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See Benston & Kaufman, supra note 58, at 149 (discussing regulators’ opposition to marketvalue accounting rules for bank assets). The FRB joined the banking industry in opposing the decision of
the Financial Accounting Sta ndards Board (“FASB”) to adopt Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards (“FAS”) 115 in 1993. FAS 115 requires banks to “mark to market” all investment securities
except for those that are properly designated as “held to maturity.” Bank executives and federal regulators
argued that FAS 115 would incr ease the “volatility” of bank earnings and expose banks to sudden
shortfalls in their capital. See David Siegel, Capital: FASB Votes to Adopt Mark-to-Market Rule, Am.
Banker, April 14, 1993, at 1; Barbara A. Rehm, Rising Rates Put Banks in Double Bind, Am. Banker,
May 13, 1994, at 1 (quoting FRB chairman Alan Greenspan).
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Similarly, the FRB supported the banking industry’s strong objection to FASB’s decision to adopt
FAS 133 in 1998. FAS 133 requires banks to apply market-value accounting principles to all derivatives
except for those that qualify for hedging treatment. Once again, bank executives and federal regulators
asserted that FASB’s new rule would create undesirable “volatility” in the reported earnings of banks. See
Elizabeth McDonald, Greenspan Urges FASB to Drop Plan On Adjusting Earnings for Derivatives, Wall
St. J., Aug. 7, 1997, at B2; Aaron Elstein, Banks Decr y Plan to Make Them Report Derivatives’ Market
Value, Am. Banker, Nov. 19, 1996, at A1; OCC Bull. 98-45, Oct. 6, 1998, reprinted in Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 62-158 (explaining the impact of FAS 133 on banks).
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The most recent evidence of regulatory opposition to strict market discipline can be seen
in the joint decision by the FRB and the Treasury Department to reject a mandatory subordinated
debt program for LCBOs. In December 2000, the two agencies announced that they would not
adopt a rule requiring major banks to issue subordinated debt satisfying specified rating and yield
requirements. The agencies’ report acknowledged that mandatory subordinat ed debt would
increase market discipline over major banks. However, the report argued, a mandatory policy
with “complex” features (e.g., a rule that required issuance at regular intervals with limits on yield
spreads, and that forced LCBOs to shrink their assets if they could not issue qualifying debt)
could impose “quite substantial costs.”134 In particular, the report warned that a mandatory
subordinated debt policy with “complex” features could have “severely pro-cyclical” effects,
including a disruption of credit flows and an increase in “systemic risk” during economic crises.135

The joint FRB-Treasury report concluded that, while further research and analysis should
be pursued, the “net benefits” of mandatory subordinated debt were “currently too uncertain to
justify adopting a mandatory policy.”136 A prominent analyst declared that the report had
“dump[ed] buckets and buckets of cold water on the idea of using subordinated debt as a tool for
market discipline.”137
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Federal Subordinated Debt Study, supra note 81, at 56.

Id. at 53-56. See also supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (discussing the risk that a
mandatory subordinated debt policy could aggravate economic downturns).
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Id. at vii.

Rob Garver, Skepticism Rising on Market as Regulator, Am. Banker, Jan. 22, 2001, at 1
[hereinafter cited as Garver, Market as Regulator] (quoting Bert Ely).
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The opposition of federal regulators to any strong form of market discipline is consistent
with their faithful adherence to the TBTF doctrine whenever they have determined that the failure
of a large financial institution could destabilize the financial system. TBTF bank rescues appear to
be part of a broader, unstated federal policy of maintaining stability within the financial markets.
This implicit policy has grown out of the recognition that (i) major banks increasingly depend on
the health of the securities and derivatives markets, due to t heir leading role in those markets, and
(ii) investments tied to the capital markets (including OTC derivatives, mutual funds, annuities
and variable life insurance) account for a rapidly growing percentage of the financial assets and
risk management tools of businesses and consumers. The rescues of TBTF banks and the FRB’s
interventions in the financial markets since 1970 provide persuasive evidence of this regulatory
commitment to market stabilization as a key policy objective.138
The FRB’s actions during the first ten mont hs of 2001 are consistent with an implicit
policy of preventing serious market disruptions. During that period, the FRB made nine cuts in
short-term interest rates and reduced those rates to t heir lowest level in almost four decades. The
FRB’s act ions in 2001 resembled its aggressive reductions of short-term interest rates during the
banking crisis and recession of the early 1990's, and again during the Russian debt crisis of
1998.139 In July 2001, FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan stated that the FRB was cutting interest

See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78
Tex. L. Rev. 777, 780, 865-72 (2000); KAUFMAN , ON MONEY AND MARKETS, supra note 34, at 208-21,
310-12; Mahoney, supra note 42, at 56-58; STEINHERR , supra note 106, at 53-61, 274-76, 282-83. See
also supra notes 35-36 & 115-17 and accompanying text (referring to federal rescues of TBT F banks a nd
the FRB’s interventions in financial markets since 1970).
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See James C. Cooper & Kathleen Madigan, Business Outlook: The Data Will Be Grim – But
Give the Fed a Chance, Bus. Week, Oct. 15, 2001, at 37 (sta ting that the FRB’s interest rate cuts dur ing
2001 were “the most aggressive easing [of monetary policy] in the postwar era”); Wilmarth, Big Bank
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rates in respo nse to a sharp downt urn in the high-technology sector that had weakened the
general economy, lowered equity prices and produced a significant “decline in stock market
wealth.”140 In discussing the proper response to “asset price bubbles,” Chairman Greenspan
revealed the FRB’s underlying goal of stabilizing the financial markets:
[O]ur only realistic response to a speculative bubble is to lean against the economic
pressures that may accompany a rise in asset prices, bubble or not, and address
forcefully the consequences of a sharp deflation in asset prices should they
occur.141
Similarly, in response to the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in September
2001, the FRB flooded the financial markets with liquidity by purchasing more than $150 billion
in government securities. The FRB successfully prevented the occurrence of a prolonged liquidity
crunch in the markets, as it did during the sto ck market crash of 1987. The FRB also reportedly
suspended the affiliate transaction rules under Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, so that
major banks could make large transfers of funds to their securities affiliates. Gerald Corrigan,
who was President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during the 1987 crash, defended
the FRB’s actions in September 2001 as being essential to maintain stability in the financial
markets: “This whole thing is a confidence game, and you better damn well think carefully of
anything that can shake . . . public confidence in the financial markets, and in particular, the stock

Mergers, supra note 26, at 45-46 (discussing the FRB’s similar actions during 1990-92); supra note 117
and accompanying text (discussing the FRB’s reduction in short-term interest rates during 1998).
Testimony of FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan before the House Comm. on Financial Services,
July 18, 2001, reprinted in 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 588, 588-91 (quotes at 591).
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Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
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market.”142
Few would question the wisdom of the FRB’s decisions to cut interest rates to counteract
a serious economic downturn, or to provide emergency liquidity support through open-market
operations during a stock market crash. However, the FRB’s actions in arranging the rescue of
LTCM in 1998, and in waiving affiliate transaction rules for LCBOs in 2001, indicate that the
FRB currently views the survival of major financial conglomerates as an indispensable element of
its broader mission to preserve market stability. Investors therefore have every reason to be
confident that the TBTF policy remains a centerpiece of U.S. financial regulation. 143
In sum, the TBTF policy is the great unresolved problem of bank supervision, because it
undermines the effectiveness of both regulatory oversight and market discipline with regard to
LCBOs.144 A recent article in the American Banker summed up the current situation in the
following words:
[A] lingering impression that the government will bail out any large institution that gets
into trouble has encouraged the markets to give financial institutions less scrutiny than
other businesses. ‘Until the market has a credible expectation that discipline is required,’
market discipline is ‘a long way off.’145

See Anita Raghavan et al., Team Effort: Banks and Regulators Drew Together to Calm
Markets After Attack, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at A1 (quoting Mr. Corrigan and reporting on the FRB’s
waiver of Section 23A); supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing restrictions on affiliate
transactions under Section 23A).
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See Robert T. Parry, Financial Services in the New Century, FRBSF Econ. Letter No. 98-15,
Fed. Res. Bank of S.F., CA, May 8, 1998, at 2 (remarks by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco’s
president); Hoenig, supra note 39, at 10-13 (speech by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s
president); Stern, supra note 39, at 4-5, 24-26 (article by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis’
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Leading financial institutions recognize that their TBTF status insulates them to a
significant degree from market discipline, and they have consistently resisted propo sals to increase
their transparency to investors. As noted above, big banks strongly opposed the adoption of
market-value accounting treatment for their trading assets during the 1990's. More recently,
major global financial institutions attacked “Pillar 3” of the Basel Committee’s January 2001
proposal, which recommended public disclosure rules designed to assist investors in evaluating
the financial condition and operations of LCBOs.146 The harsh responses of leading financial
institut ions, together with subsequent concessions announced by the Basel Committee, have
created further doubts about the prospects for establishing effective market discipline over
financial conglomerates. 147
See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing the banking industry’s opposition to
FAS 115 and FAS 133). In opposing “Pillar 3" of the Basel Committee’s January 2001 proposal,
FleetBoston asserted that “[t]he disclosure requirements are fundamentally flawed and should be dropped. .
. . The market is sufficiently well informed already.” UBS agreed that the Basel Committee should forgo
all mandatory public disclosures and should rely instead on confidential reports to bank supervisors.
Merrill Lynch argued that “[i]f information is publicly disclosed that shows a firm has significant risk
exposure and will require short-term funding, then it is unlikely that the firm will be able to obtain a
favorable funding rate as a result of this exposure.” (In other words, Merrill Lynch opposed the proposed
disclosure requirements for credit risk because they would produce more effective market discipline!) See
Barbara A. Rehm, Making Basel Better: In Basel Tune-Up, Disclosure Slammed, Am. Banker, July 10,
2001, at 1 (quoting statements by representatives of the three institutions).
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Perhaps the most distressing comment was offered by J.P. Morgan Chase, which warned that
“[t]he snapshot nature of disclosure practices makes it virtually impossible for users to have an up-to-date
picture of a bank’s risk profile, given how dynamically portfolios can change.” Id. This comment supports
the view of many analysts, who believe that regulators and market pa rticipa nts cannot effectively monitor
LCBOs because of their rapidly expanding use of OTC derivatives and other complex, highly-leveraged
financial instruments. See supra notes 106 & 109 and accompanying text.
In September 2001, the Basel Committee released a revised version of its proposed “Pillar 3."
In response to industry critics, the Basel Committee stated that its revisions “streamlin[ed] the proposals”
for market discipline and made a “significant reduction” in the total amount of required public disclosure.
Basel Comm. on Bank Supervision, Working Paper on Pillar 3 – Market Discipline, Sept. 2001, at 1
(available at <www.bis.org>). Notwithstanding these concessions, banking industry representatives
continued to attack the revised public disclosure proposal. See Richard Cowden, Capital: Bank Industry
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III.

A New Regulatory Regime Is Needed to Counteract the Risk-Taking Incentives of
Financial Conglomerates
Given the shortcomings of current approaches to regulatory oversight and market

discipline, it is time to adopt a new regulatory program that has a better chance of reducing the
risk-taking incentives of LCBOs. As described below, my proposed program has three major
elements: (i) protecting the deposit insurance system from the expense of TBTF bailouts, (ii)
requiring financial conglomerates to bear primary responsibility for the financial costs of such
bailouts, and (iii) implementing additional reforms designed to force major financial institutions to
internalize the costs of their risk-taking.
A.

Insulating the Deposit Insurance System from TBTF Bailouts

The most effective way to protect the deposit insurance system from the cost of TBTF
rescues is to create a two-tiered structure of bank regulation and deposit insurance.148 The first
tier would consist of “traditional” banking organizations that limit their activities (including the
activities of all holding company affiliates) to lines of business that meet the “closely related to
banking” test in Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act. For example, this first tier of traditional banks
could take deposits, make loans and offer fiduciary services. They could act as agents in selling
securities and insurance products underwritten by non-affiliated firms. They could underwrite,
purchase and deal in “bank-eligible” securities that national banks are permitted to underwrite or

Experts React Negatively To Working Papers on Basel Capital Accord, 77 BNA’s Banking Rep. 563
(2001).
For a previous description of this proposal for a two-tiered structure of bank regulation and
deposit insurance, see Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 26, at 77-87. As indicated in that article, I
am indebted to Robert Litan for many of the concepts incorporated in my two-tiered proposal. See, e.g.,
ROBERT E LITAN , WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO ? 164-89 (1987).
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deal in directly.149 They could use derivatives for bona fide hedging transactions that qualify for
hedging treatment under FAS 133.150 Virtually all of these traditional banks would be smaller,
community-based banks, because those banks do not have any comparative advantage – and
therefore have not shown any substantial interest – in engaging as principal in insurance
underwriting, securities underwriting, derivatives dealing or other capital markets activities. In
contrast, these community banks are well positioned to continue their established business of
attracting core deposits, providing relationship loans to consumers and firms, and providing
wealth management services through their fiduciary operations.
In order to ensure reasonable competitive flexibility for this first tier of traditional banks,
Congress should amend Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act by permitting the FRB to expand the list
of “closely related” activities for holding company affiliates of traditional banks. Unfortunately,
the GLB Act removed the FRB’s authority to approve any new “closely related” activities for
bank holding companies under Section 4(c)(8).151 Under my proposed amendment, Section

Securities eligible for bank underwriting, investment and dealing include U.S. government
securities, as well as general obligation securities and revenue bonds issued by state and local governments.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(Seventh) & 1831a; MC COY , supra note 3, § 7.03 (explaining the difference between
“bank-eligible” securities, which banks are permitted to underwrite, deal in or purchase, and “bankineligible” securities).
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See supra note 133 (discussing FASB’s adoption of FAS 133).

See Malloy, supra note 2, at 801 (observing that the GLB Act “freezes in place,” as of
November 12, 1999, the authority of nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies to engage in
activities that are “closely related to banking” under Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C. §
1843(c)(8)). In practical effect, the GLB Act forces bank holding companies to re-designate themselves as
financial holding companies in order to engage in any new activities that are not on the grandfathered list of
“closely related” activities under Section 4(c)(8), but a re approved as “financial in nature” under new
Section 4(k) of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k). Congress should revise Section 4(c)(8) so that the
FRB has authority to approve a limited range of new activities that are “closely related” to the traditional
banking functions of accepting deposits, extending credit, discounting negotiable instr uments and providing
fiduciary services. See Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 26, at 80 n.365, 84 & n.378.
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4(c)(8) would allow the FRB to approve new types of financial services for holding company
affiliates of first-tier banks as long as those services are “closely relat ed” to traditional banking
funct ions. Traditional banks and their holding companies would continue t o operate under their
current supervisory arrangements, and all of the banks’ deposits (up to the statutory limit) would
be covered by deposit insurance.152
In contrast, depository institutions and their affiliates would be placed in the second tier of
“nontraditional” banking organizations if they engage in (i) underwriting or trading in “bankineligible” securities, (ii) underwriting insurance (except for credit insurance), (iii) dealing or
trading in derivatives (except for bona fide hedging transactions recognized under FAS 133), or
(iv) merchant banking. Second-tier nontraditional banking organizations would include: (A)
financial holding companies that decide to exercise any of the securities underwriting, merchant
banking and insurance underwriting powers granted by the GLB Act, (B) holding companies
owning grandfathered “nonbank banks,” and (C) grandfathered “unitary thrift” holding
companies.153 Thus, second-tier nontraditional holding companies would encompass all of the
largest banking organizations, which are heavily engaged in capital markets activities, together
with other financial conglomerates that control FDIC-insured depository institutions.154
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See Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 26, at 84-86.

See, e.g., Broome & Markham, supra note 3, at 743-44, 771-72 (describing how nonbank
holding companies acquired FDIC-insured depository institutions under the “nonbank bank” and “unitary
thrift” loopholes, and how those holding companies were “grandfathered” under a 1987 federal sta tute and
the GLB Act, respectively); Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part II(C) (explaining that, during
the 1980's and 1990's, many leading securities firms and life insur ance companies used the “nonbank bank”
and “unitary thrift” loopholes to acquire FDIC-insured banks and thrifts).
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See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Parts I(D)(2), I(E) & II(C) (discussing the sharp
differences between the operating stra tegies of major banks and nonbank financial conglomerates and the
business focus of smaller, community-oriented banks).
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Under my proposal, all FDIC-insured depository institutions that are subsidiaries of
second-tier nontraditional holding companies would be required to adopt a “narrow bank”
structure. These narrow banks would hold all of their assets in the form of cash and highly
marketable debt obligations, such as qualifying government securities, highly-rated commercial
paper and other debt instruments eligible for investment by money market mutual funds
(“MMMFs”) under rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission. In addition, narrow banks
could not accept any uninsured deposits. Narrow banks wo uld present a very small risk to the
FDIC’s deposit insurance funds, because (i) each narrow bank’s assets would be “marked to
market” on a daily basis, and the FDIC could therefore quickly determine whether a narrow bank
was threatened with insolvency, and (ii) the FDIC could quickly convert a narrow bank’s assets
into cash if the FDIC decided to liquidate the bank to pay off the claims of its insured
depositors. 155
Given the foregoing asset restrictions, the FDIC would be largely protected from loss in
the event of a failure involving an insured narrow bank that was owned by a nontraditional
holding company. In addition, my proposal would prevent nontraditional holding companies and
their nonbanking subsidiaries from exploiting the federal subsidy provided by deposit insurance.
This goal would require three basic reforms designed to insulate the narrow bank from its
nonbank affiliates. First, each insured narrow bank would be prohibited from engaging in any
transfers of funds or credit involving its affiliates, except for (i) the bank’s payment of dividends
out of profits to its parent holding company, and (ii) the bank’s receipt of capital infusions from
its parent holding company. Second, if a narrow bank failed, the FDIC would be strictly
155

See Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 26, at 79-82.

76

prohibited from making payments to anyone who was not an insured depositor of the bank.
Third, the “systemic risk” exception included in FDICIA would be abolished. As a result, the
FDIC would be required to follow the least costly resolution procedure for all failed banks, and
the FDIC could no longer rely on the TBTF policy as a justification for protecting uninsured
creditors of a failed bank or its nonbank affiliates.156 As discussed below, the FRB would
undertake primary responsibility for TBTF problems under its LOLR powers. 157
Insulating the FDIC’s deposit insurance funds from the possibility of TBTF bailouts would
have several major benefits. It would make clear to the financial markets that the FDIC’s deposit
insurance funds could only be used to protect insured depositors of failed banks. Uninsured
creditors of a financial holding company – regardless of its size – would no longer have any
reasonable expectation of being protected by the FDIC if the holding company or any of its
banking or nonbanking subsidiaries failed. Shareho lders and creditors of the holding company
would therefore have greater incentives to monitor its financial condition. Moreover, the narrow
bank format would eliminate the ability of financial conglomerates to exploit the deposit insurance
subsidy by orchestrating transfers of funds or credit from their insured depository subsidiaries to
nonbank affiliates. Because all such transfers would be flatly prohibited (except for lawful
dividends paid by the bank and capital infusions made by the parent holding company), bank

See supra note 35 (discussing the “systemic risk” exception under the Section 141 of FDICIA,
which allows the FDIC, with the concurrence of the FRB and the Treasury Dept., to protect uninsured
creditors in resolving a TBTF bank); Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 31, at 995-96 (explaining that
the FDICIA requires the FDIC – except in a situation involving “systemic risk” – to choose the least costly
method for resolving a bank failur e, an approach that usually results in liquidating the bank’s assets and
arranging for a transfer or payoff of the bank’s insured deposits).
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authority).

See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12, Part I(D)(4)(b)(iv) (discussing the FRB’s LOLR
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regulators would find it relatively easy to determine whether any unauthorized transfers were
taking place.
A further benefit of my proposal is that traditional banks (which, as noted abo ve, are likely
to be smaller banks) would no longer bear any part of the cost of rescuing uninsured creditors of
TBTF banks. Under current law, all FDIC-insured banks must pay a special assessment (allocated
in proportion to their total assets) to reimburse the FDIC for the cost of protecting uninsured
claimants in a “systemic risk” bailout. The FDIC has noted the unfairness of expecting smaller
banks – which could never be the subject of a TBTF rescue – to help pay for “systemic risk”
bailouts. The FDIC has suggested that the way to correct this inequity is “to remove the systemic
risk exception from the [FDI Act].”158 As already noted, such an amendment to the FDI Act is a
key part of my proposal.
Critics have raised two major objections to t he narrow bank concept. First, critics point
out that the asset restrictions imposed on narrow banks would prevent them from acting as
intermediaries of funds between depositors and borrowers. As indicated above, most narrow
bank proponents would require such banks to invest their deposit s in safe, highly marketable
assets such as those permitted for MMMFs. Narrow banks would therefore be largely or entirely
barred from making commercial loans. As a result, a banking system composed exclusively of
narrow banks co uld not provide credit to small and midsized firms that lack access to the

Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Options Paper, Aug. 2000 [hereinafter cited as 2000 FDIC Options
Paper], at 34. See also Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supr a note 31, at 996-97 (explaining that, under Section
141 of FDICIA, the FDIC must recover the cost of a “systemic risk” bailout by imposing a special
assessment on all FDIC-insured banks in proportion to their total assets).
158

78

securities markets.159
However, my two -tiered proposal should greatly reduce any disruption of the traditional
role of banks in acting as intermediaries between depositors and business borrowers. My
proposal would permit first-tier traditional banks to continue making commercial loans that are
funded by deposits. As I have shown elsewhere, community-based banks make most o f their
commercial loans in the form of longer-term “relationship” loans to small and midsized firms.
Community banks have significant advantages in making such loans, because (i) their main offices
are located in the communities where they make most of their commercial loans, t hereby enabling
their executives to be better informed about the character, reputation and skills of local business
owners, (ii) they maintain greater continuity in their branch managers and loan officers, thereby
allowing those officers to build stronger relationships with local business owners, and (iii) they
operate in a relatively non-heirarchical and decentralized manner and therefore provide greater
flexibility to their loan officers and loan customers.
As indicated above, community banks are unlikely to enter the securities or insurance
businesses (except in an agency capacity), and most o f them would probably choose to become
first-tier traditional banks within my proposed two-tier structure. Those banks could continue to
carry on their deposit-taking and lending activities without any change from current law, and t heir
primary commercial lending customers would remain smaller firms that cannot obtain credit from

See, e.g., John H. Boyd & Mark Gertler, U.S. Commercial Banking: Trends, Cycles, and
Policy, in O LIVIER J. BLANCHARD & STANLEY FISCHER, EDS., NBER MACROEC ONOM ICS ANNUAL 1993,
at 319, 363; Neil Wallace, Narrow Banking Meets the Diamond-Dybvig Model, 20 Q. Rev. No. 1, Fed.
Res. Bank of Minneapolis, MN, Winter 1996, at 3. See also Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 26,
at 79-81 (explaining that most narrow bank proposals would prohibit narrow banks from making
commercial loans, except perhaps for a limited basket of loans based on a fraction of their equity capital).
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the securities markets. While deposit insurance for first-tier traditional banks would provide a
partial subsidy for their lending activities, I believe that such a subsidy is justified in view of (i) the
importance of the small business sector and its heavy reliance on bank credit, (ii) the effective
specialization of community banks in providing relationship loans to small firms, and (iii) past
evidence indicating that relationship lending by community banks is a relatively safe and profitable
activity which has not been a source of significant losses to the deposit insurance funds in the past.

In contrast to community banks, most big banks do not make a substantial number of
relationship loans to small firms. Instead, big banks provide credit to smaller firms primarily
through highly-automated, “transaction-based” programs that (A) disburse loans in relatively
small amounts (usually under $100,000) in a manner similar to credit card loans, (B) use highlycentralized and impersonal approval methods based on credit scoring, and (C) are designed to
permit securitization of the loans into asset-backed securities that are sold to investors in the
capital markets. As indicated above, most large banks would become second-tier nontraditional
banking organizations under my proposal, and their insured deposit-taking activities would be
conducted through narrow banks. Second-tier organizations would be required to conduct their
business lending programs through nonbank finance subsidiaries, which could be funded by
commercial paper and other debt instrument s sold to investors in the capital markets. The
requirement that second-tier banks use nonbank subsidiaries for their commercial loans should not
create a substantial disincentive for the small business lending programs currently offered by big
banks, because a major portion of those programs is already financed by the capital markets
through securitization. Thus, my two-tier proposal should not result in a significant disruption of
80

bank lending, because big banks have largely moved away from traditional relationship-based
lending funded by deposits. Instead, major banks provide transactions-based credit through loan
programs (e.g., securitization and syndication) that rely primarily on investors in the capital
markets for funding.160
The second major criticism of narrow bank proposals is that they would lack credibility,
because federal regulators would retain the inherent authority (whether explicit or implicit) to
organize bailouts of major financial firms during periods of severe economic distress.
Accordingly, critics charge, the narrow bank concept simply shifts the TBTF problem from the
insured bank to its nonbank affiliates. 161 I attempt to answer this criticism in the following section,
in which I propose to transfer to the FRB – with important new restrictions – the responsibility
for administering TBTF rescues.
B.

Assigning the FRB with Responsibility over TBTF Institutions

Given its new role as umbrella supervisor of financial holding companies, as well as its
traditional authority over monetary policy and the payments system, the FRB is in the best
position to deal with large financial conglomerates whose failure might create systemic risk in the

For more detailed discussions of the topics covered in the pr eceding three paragraphs, see
Wilmarth, Big Bank Mergers, supra note 26, at 34-41, 79-83; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 12,
Parts I(D)(2) & (3). For a recent study confirming that community banks have significant organizational
advantages in providing “relationship-based” loans to small firms, while large banks are likely to provide
only impersonal, “transaction-based” credit to such firms, see Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Small
Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure,
Fin. & Econ. Discussion Ser. Working Paper 2001-36, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys. (available at
<www.federalreserve.gov>), Econ. J. (2002) (forthcoming).
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See, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 39, at 689-90; Stern, supra note 39, at 25-26.
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financial markets. 162 As LOLR, the FRB can provide emergency discount window advances to
prevent or post pone the failure of a major financial institution or its affiliates. 163 Thus, my
proposed reform of the deposit insurance system would authorize the FRB to use its LOLR
authority to support large financial institutions in situations involving “systemic risk.”
However, three reforms must be implemented to prevent the FRB from using its LOLR
authority in a way that would encourage moral hazard and excessive risk-taking among large
financial conglomerates. First, the FRB should be required to obtain the Treasury Department’s
concurrence before making any discount window advances for the purpose of protecting creditors
(other than holders of FDIC-insured deposits) of a failing financial institution or its affiliates.
Second, the FRB should be obligat ed to recover the unpaid balance of any emergency advance by
imposing a special assessment on other holding companies of the same class as the entity that
received the advance.164 This reform would require the FRB to charge all second-tier depository

See supra note 4 (observing that the GLB Act designates the FRB as the “umbrella regulator”
for financial holding companies); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Risk Not Function, 66 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 441, 478-86 (1998) (proposing that, in view of the FRB’s statutory responsibilities for establishing
monetary policy, regulating the payments system and supervising bank holding companies, the FRB should
act as the “systemic risk regulator” with respect to financial conglomerates).
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The FRB has authority to act provide discount window loans to banks under 12 U.S.C. §§ 347,
347a & 347b. In addition, under 12 U.S.C. § 343, the FRB may extend discount window loans to nonbank
entities in “unusual and exigent circumstances.” Section 343, as amended in 1991, enables the FRB to
provide emergency liquidity support to securities firms and other nonbank firms after a major economic
shock similar to the 1987 stock market crash. See Walker F. Todd, FDICIA’s Emergency Liquidity
Provisions, 29 Econ. Rev. No. 3, Fed. Res. Bank of Cleve., OH, 3d Qtr . 1993, at 16, 19-22; S. Rep. No.
167, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 202-03 (1991).
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The two foregoing conditions would be similar to provisions currently embodied in the FDIC’s
“systemic risk” authority under Section 141 of FDICIA. See Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 31, at
996-97 (explaining that Section 141 requires the FDIC to (i) obtain the concurrence of the FRB and the
Treasury Dept. before protecting any uninsured creditors of a TBTF bank, and (ii) to make a special ex
post assessment on the banking industry to recover the cost of any such bailout).
164

82

institut ion holding co mpanies, in proportion to t heir total assets, for the unpaid balance of any
discount window loan extended to a second-tier holding company. As indicated above, the
second-tier category would include (i) financial holding companies registered under Section 4(k)
of the BHC Act, (ii) holding companies owning grandfathered “nonbank banks,” and (iii)
grandfathered “unitary thrift” holding companies.165
Potential liability for FRB special assessments would give each nontraditional holding
company a st rong incentive to monitor other second-tier organizations and to alert the FRB if the
holding company became aware of circumstances indicating that a competitor was taking
excessive risks or was otherwise exposed to losses that might threaten its solvency. A system of
joint liability and mutual discipline could be formalized by organizing second-tier holding
companies into one or more self-regulating clearinghouses. Such clearinghouses could attract
members based on a common geographic location or similar product offerings. A clearinghouse
structure would allow its members to establish rules for (i) monitoring the financial condition of
each member, (ii) settling obligations between members, and (iii) providing assistance to
weakened members during market disruptions. Each clearinghouse could also organize a selfinsurance system by requiring its members to make contributions to a reserve fund, which could
be used to help members during financial emergencies or pay FRB special assessments for unpaid

See supra note 153 and accompanying text (explaining that the proposed “second tier” of
“nontraditional” banking organizations would include these three categories of holding companies).
Similarly, if the FRB pr ovided an emergency discount window advance to protect the creditors of a failing
securities firm or insurance company that was not affiliated with an insured depository institution, my
proposal would require the FRB to make a special assessment on similar non-affiliated securities firms or
insurance companies to recover any unpaid balance of that advance.
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discount window loans to members.166
Under my third LOLR reform, the FRB could not make emergency advances to protect
uninsured creditors of a depository institution or its affiliates unless a mandatory deduction, or
“haircut,” was assessed against all uninsured claims. Requiring abo ut a 10% “haircut” would
appear reasonable, as it would encourage uninsured creditors to exercise greater discipline over
financial holding companies but would probably not be so great as to trigger contagious “runs” by
large depositors, holders of commercial paper and other uninsured short-term creditors.167 The
FRB could be given discretion to waive this mandatory “haircut” in an except ional case involving
a systemic economic crisis. However, as an appropriate disincentive, the FRB should be obligated
to use its own reserves to pay for the cost of such waivers.
Assigning responsibility for TBTF problems to the FRB is consistent with the two-tier
regulatory structure suggested above. The FRB would concentrate its supervisory attention on
diversified financial holding companies whose failure could create systemic risk concerns and
adversely affect the conduct of monetary policy. The same class of financial conglomerates would
pay special assessments to cover the cost o f TBTF bailouts. As a result, those conglomerates (i)
would have reduced moral hazard incentives to pursue high-risk activities, because they could no
longer shift their losses to the FDIC’s deposit insurance fund, and (ii) would have stronger

For descriptions of the monitoring, liquidity and self-insurance services provided by private
bank clearinghouses to their members prior to the creation of the FRB and the FDIC, see, e.g., Charles W.
Calomiris, U.S. Bank Deregulation in Historical Perspective 8-10, 60, 71 (2000); David G. Oedel, Private
Interbank Discipline, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 327, 344-60 (1993).
166

See, e.g., Feldman & Rolnick, supra note 35, at 11-16 (suggesting that uninsured creditors of a
TBTF bank should be required to absorb a “coinsurance” deductible of up to 20% of their claims if the
bank fails).
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incentives to monitor the risk profiles and financial soundness of their competitors.
C.

Three Additional Reforms to Increase Supervisory and Market Discipline
over Financial Conglomerates

The proposals o utlined above would significantly reduce the TBTF subsidy currently
enjoyed by large financial conglomerates. However, three further reforms are urgently needed to
correct existing flaws in supervisory and market discipline.
First, Congress must repeal the 1996 law which forces the FDIC to provide free deposit
insurance to more than 90% of all insured banks and thrifts. As noted above, the 1996 legislation
prevents the FDIC from collecting deposit insurance premiums from “well capitalized” and “well
managed” institut ions as long as the reserve ratio for each deposit insurance fund remains above
its statutory minimum of 1.25%. As a result, more than 900 recently-chartered depository
institutions have never paid premiums on their insured deposits. In addition, since 2000,
Citigroup and Merrill Lynch have enabled their brokerage customers to transfer more than $75
billion into insured deposit acco unts at affiliated banks, again without paying any premiums to the
FDIC. By late 2001, the growth of insured deposits at these “free rider” institutions threatened to
reduce the BIF’s reserve ratio below the statutory floor of 1.25%.168
Congress must bring an end to this unfair “free riding” on the deposit insurance funds.
Congress can do so by amending the FDI Act in two respects. The first amendment would
authorize the FDIC to impose a retroactive risk-based assessment based on deposit growth at
every insured institution that has not paid deposit insurance premiums since December 31, 1996

See supra notes 46-47; Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Keeping the Promise: Recommendations for
Deposit Insurance Reform, April 2001 (available at <www.fdic.gov>) [hereinafter cited as 2001 FDIC
Reform Plan], at 2-5; Rob Blackwell, Solly’s Sweeps Show FDIC Fund Worries Still Apply, Am. Banker,
Oct. 29, 2001, at 1.
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(the effective beginning date for free deposit insurance).169 The second amendment would require
all FDIC-insured institutions to pay prospective risk-based premiums, regardless of their
capitalization and supervisory ratings.170
A second reform is needed to ensure that financial conglomerat es, like Citigroup and
Merrill Lynch, assume full responsibility for the potential costs of their broker-dealer “sweep”
programs. As previously noted, these “sweep” programs circumvent the $100,000 ceiling on
deposit insurance by enabling brokerage customers to make structured transfers into insured
deposit accounts at two or more affiliated banks.171 Under my two-tiered proposal for deposit
insurance coverage, most of the moral hazard threat created by these “sweep” programs would be
removed. As explained above, financial holding companies with broker-dealer affiliates would be
allowed to accept insured deposits only within narrow banks. In addition, strict limitations would
be imposed on transactions between narrow banks and their affiliates, thereby preventing narrow
banks from transferring their deposit insurance subsidy to nonbank affiliates.
To eliminate any further risk to the FDIC from “sweep” programs, I would expand the
cross-guarantee provision of the FDI Act. When an insured bank fails, the cross-guarantee statute
currently allows the FDIC to assess all affiliated banks for the net cost of resolving the failed
The FDIC recently determined that a n average assessment rate of 11.2 basis points would have
been sufficient to equate premium revenues with expenses and losses incurred by the BIF during 1980-99.
See 2000 FDIC Options Paper, supra note 158, at 24 & tbl. 3. Accordingly, the FDIC should be
authorized to impose an average assessment rate of about 11 ba sis points (with appr opriate variations
based on the risk of each insured bank) on deposit growth at each insur ed bank that has not paid premiums
since 1996.
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In early 2001, the FDIC issued a detailed proposal calling for such legislation. See 2001 FDIC
Reform Plan, supra note 168.
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See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (discussing broker-to-bank sweep pr ograms
established by Citigroup and Merrill Lynch).
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bank.172 The scope of the cross-guarantee provision should be extended to include affiliated
broker-dealers whenever the FDIC can show that (i) an affiliated broker-dealer assisted
customers in making structured transfers of funds into insured deposit accounts at two or more
affiliated banks, and (ii) those structured t ransfers produced, in practical effect, an evasion of the
deposit insurance limits and thereby increased the FDIC’s net cost of handling the failure of any
affiliated bank.
My third set of reforms would be aimed at increasing market discipline over major
financial conglomerates. For example, federal regulators should promptly implement “Pillar 3" of
the proposed new Basel accord, which would require LCBOs to provide more extensive and
timely disclosures to investors about their risk exposures and risk management systems. In
addition, regulators should require LCBOs to issue publicly-traded senior or subordinated debt
securities on a frequent basis. I would permit regulators to experiment with publicly-traded debt
requirements over a period of five years and then report to Congress on the prospects for
adopting a more formalized system of market-based discipline (e.g., a program requiring LCBOs
to issue qualifying subordinated debt on a continuous basis, with mandatory PCA sanctions for
institutions that are unable to do so).
Regulators should also revise their monitoring systems to incorporate signals from the
capital markets. Recent studies have shown that regulatory oversight would be more effective if
supervisors frequently reviewed market signals such as (i) equity securities prices, (ii) yield
spreads and ratings on senior and subordinated debt securities, and (iii) interest rates paid on
uninsured deposits and interbank loans. While market discipline is unlikely to replace supervisory
172

See 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e); Jackson, Holding Company Obligations, supra note 98, at 536-37.
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oversight within the foreseeable future, market-based signals would provide regulators with
helpful tools for analyzing the financial condition and potential risks of large, publicly-traded
financial institutions.173
Conclusion
The U.S. financial services industry has been fundamentally restructured over the past
quarter century, culminating in the emergence of big universal banks and other large financial
conglomerates. The GLB Act ratified this ongoing consolidation of the financial services industry
by authorizing financial holding companies to engage in a wide range of activities that transcend
the traditional boundaries separating banks from securities firms and insurance companies.
Unfortunately, regulatory policies have not kept pace with the challenges of supervising
financial conglomerates. These giant institutions present formidable risks to the federal safety net
and are largely insulated from both market discipline and supervisory intervention. Leading banks
have aggressively pursued expansion strategies designed to achieve TBTF status, which provides
guaranteed access to low-cost funding and regulatory concessions.
International and domestic regulators have tinkered with supervisory policies in the vain
hope that revised capital rules, better oversight procedures and increased disclosures to investors
will induce financial conglomerates to adopt prudent risk management policies. However, the
unmistakable lesson of the past t hree decades is t hat regulators will protect major financial firms
against failure whenever such action is deemed necessary to preserve the stability of the capital

See, e.g., Berger, Davies & Flannery, supra note 97; DeYoung et al., supra note 97; Ron
Feldman & Mark Levonian, Market Data and Bank Supervision: The Transition to Practical Use, 15
Region No. 3, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, MN, Sept. 2001, at 11; Jeffery W. Gunther, Mark E.
Levonian & Robert R. Moore, Can the Stock Market Tell Bank Supervisors Anything They Don’t Already
Know?, Econ. & Fin. Rev., Fed. Res. Bank of Dallas, TX, 2d Qtr. 2001, at 2.
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markets. As a consequence, financial institutions understand that they can increase their leverage
and pursue more risky activities as they grow in size and complexity. Without a comprehensive
reform of the current regulat ory structure, financial conglomerates will continue t o exploit the
subsidies provided under the TBTF policy and other components of the federal safety net.
This paper proposes a fundamental overhaul of the current regulatory system for financial
conglomerates. Under my plan, diversified banking organizations would be allowed to accept
insured deposits only through narrow banks. Strict limitations on affiliate transactions would
prevent narrow banks from transferring their deposit insurance subsidy to nonbank affiliates. The
FDIC’s deposit insurance funds would be used solely to pay insured depositor claims and would
be completely insulated from the potential cost of TBTF bailouts. The FRB would bear primary
responsibility for dealing with financial failures involving systemic risk, and the cost of TBTF
rescues would be borne entirely by the TBTF policy’s potential beneficiaries – viz., large
financial conglomerates. Three additional measures would increase the effectiveness of
supervisory and market discipline over universal banks. In combination, these reforms would
significantly reduce the incentives for excessive risk-taking that currently exist in our financial
system.
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.
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